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INTRODUCTION
Consumers today rent, share, and recycle goods more than ever 
before.1  As one millennial blogger recently put it: 
 1. See Fleura Bardhi & Giana M. Eckhardt, Access-Based Consumption: The Case of 
Car Sharing, 39 J. CONSUMER RES. 881, 881 (2012) [hereinafter Bardhi & Eckhardt, Access-
Based Consumption](describing the decline in consumer desire for traditional ownership 
and increasing interest in shared access or resource pooling); Rudy Telles, Jr., Digital 
Matching Firms: A New Definition in the “Sharing Economy” Space, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
ECONOMIST (Econ. and Stat. Admin. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce), June 3, 2016, at 7–8 (using 
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I rent just about everything in my life: what I wear, what I watch, 
what I listen to, how I eat.  I get my music through Spotify, my 
entertainment through Netflix, and my transportation through 
Uber. [ . . . ] I own the staples, and I rent almost all of the rest. 
My rental life is not unusual among people in my generation.  
Some call it the “sharing economy.”2
While millennials may have embraced this new lifestyle more than 
any other generation, the so-called “sharing economy” cuts across all age 
groups and demographics.3  Nineteen percent of the total U.S. adult 
population has engaged in a sharing economy transaction, while 44% report 
being familiar with the notion.4  The largest percentage of providers in this 
new sector are split between 25 to 34 year olds and 35 to 44 year olds,5
while a full 43% of all U.S. consumers agree that “owning today feels like 
a burden.”6
But what exactly is the sharing economy?  If you ask five people, you 
may get five different answers.  Some will point to companies like Zipcar 
and Airbnb that use Internet platforms to enable shared access to 
underutilized goods and services (i.e., cars and spare rooms).7 Others will 
point to Internet platforms like TaskRabbit and Uber, which match workers 
data from various sharing economy surveys to estimate size of sharing economy and “digital 
matching firms,” a term defined as a subset of the broader sharing economy), 
http://www.esa.gov/sites/default/files/digital-matching-firms-new-definition-sharing-
economy-space.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZL9-NWY7]. 
 2. Logan Whiteside, Why I Rent Everything: From Clothes to Jewelry, CNN:
MILLENNIALS & THEIR MONEY, May 13, 2015, http://money.cnn.com/2015/05/13/pf/ 
millennial-rent-economy-clothes-jewelry [https://perma.cc/BC52-M5WP]. 
 3. Thirty-four percent of individuals aged 16 to 34 identify as either participating in a 
sharing service or planning to do so within the next year, as compared to thirty percent of 
those aged 35 to 54. See Deirdre Fretz, Demographics Drive Sharing Economy as 
Millennials Seek More for Less, in BLOOMBERG BRIEF: THE SHARING ECONOMY (June 15, 
2015), http://newsletters.briefs.bloomberg.com/document/4vz1acbgfrxz8uwan9/the-users-
millennials [https://perma.cc/VY3G-MPFE] (noting millennials are more likely to 
participate in the sharing economy). 
 4. Consumer Intelligence Series: The Sharing Economy, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 8
(2015), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/technology/publications/assets/pwc-consumer-
intelligence-series-the-sharing-economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/HD9L-YXC2]. 
 5. Id. at 10. 
 6. Id. at 17. 
 7. The Rise of the Sharing Economy, TRIPLEPUNDIT, http://www.triplepundit.com/ 
special/rise-of-the-sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/7PC6-AM44] (last visited July 17, 
2016) (“The ‘sharing economy’ describes a type of business built on the sharing of 
resources . . . think Airbnb or Zipcar.”); Joseph Shuford, Hotel, Motel, Holiday Inn and 
Peer-to-Peer Rentals: The Sharing Economy, North Carolina, and the Constitution, 16 
N.C.J.L. & TECH. 301, 301–02 (Online ed. 2015) (“Airbnb. Uber. ThredUP False [A]ll three 
are participants of a rapidly growing business model called the ‘sharing economy.’”); see
also notes 33-37 and accompanying text. 
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and underemployed individuals with those in need of services and 
everything from waiting in line for concert tickets to a ride home from the 
airport.8  Some may point out that exchanging goods and services for profit, 
as these services do, seems a far cry from “sharing.”9  Such people may 
point to tool-sharing collectives, gardening cooperatives, or other non-
commercial entities designed to allow for actual sharing, in which 
individuals either jointly own goods or allow others to use their goods 
without seeking direct remuneration, as more appropriate examples.10
In 2010, a notion of “collaborative consumption,” which focused on 
access to shared goods rather than individual ownership, caught hold in the 
popular imagination.11  Rebranded and expanded into the much larger 
concept we now know as the “sharing economy,”12 this cultural 
phenomenon and the unique business models it spawned pose an increasing 
challenge for legal scholars and regulators and, some would argue, an 
increasing threat to consumers and workers.13  Industry giants Uber, Lyft, 
 8. See Noam Scheiber, Corporate America Is Using the Sharing Economy to Turn Us 
Into Temps, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 23, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/120378/ 
wonolo-temp-worker-app-shows-scary-future-sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/4EM3-
6JXM] (describing startups, including Uber and TaskRabbit, that use short-term temporary 
labor to perform services for individuals and businesses); John Patrick Pullen, Everything
You Need to Know About Uber, TIME (Nov. 4, 2014), http://time.com/3556741/uber 
[https://perma.cc/RW4B-TEUT] (providing overview of Uber, including controversial 
“surge” pricing); Brad Stone, My Life as a Task Rabbit: A Short Career in the Distributed 
Workforce, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-
09-13/my-life-as-a-taskrabbit [https://perma.cc/Q6HC-C9H9] (describing the “distributed 
workforce” and the author’s experience working as a “task rabbit”). 
 9. See Russell Belk, Sharing, 36 J. CONSUMER RES. 715, 715–21 (2010) (providing an 
in-depth discussion of the concept of sharing and characteristics that distinguish it from 
commodity exchanges). 
 10. See Juliet B. Schor, Getting Sharing Right, in On the Sharing Economy, CONTEXTS:
VIEWPOINTS, AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL ASS’N (Feb. 23, 2015), https://contexts.org/ 
articles/on-the-sharing-economy/#schor [https://perma.cc/7KCV-SSGE] (describing a class 
of peer-to-peer internet platforms, including time banks, landsharing, and couch surfing, as 
true “sharing”); Stacco Troncoso, Is Sharewashing the New Greenwashing?, P2P
FOUNDATION (May 23, 2014), http://blog.p2pfoundation.net/is-sharewashing-the-new-
greenwashing/2014/05/23 [https://perma.cc/CQ49-4CVC] (defining sharing as “the non-
monetary movement of goods and services between friends and within communities”). 
 11. RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS: THE RISE OF 
COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION xv (2010); see also infra notes 22-26 and accompanying 
text.
 12. See infra Part I.A.
 13. See Sofia Ranchordás, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation in the 
Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 413, 420 (2015) (describing the regulatory 
clash between “the interest to stimulate innovation and the need to protect the public from 
its potential harms”); Lydia DePillis, At the Uber for Home Cleaning, Workers Pay a Price 
for Convenience, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/storyline/wp/2014/09/10/at-the-uber-for-home-cleaning-workers-pay-a-price-for-
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and Airbnb, have been the subject of labor demonstrations, regulatory 
proceedings, class action lawsuits, initiative campaigns, and expansive 
subpoenas for data related to taxes and regulatory compliance.14  Calls for 
regulation of “sharing” businesses appear on many fronts, including those 
of labor, safety, taxation, and zoning.15
Another risk to consumers concerns the mistaken assumption that 
sharing economy companies always benefit society.  Because members of 
the original sharing economy often touted a social and environmental 
mission, new sharing economy companies may benefit unjustly from a 
misperception that they are socially beneficial.16  Just as firms once 
convenience [https://perma.cc/2745-LKZL] (describing difficulties experienced by 
independent contractors cleaning homes for Homejoy, a web-based housecleaning 
enterprise); Claire Cain Miller, When Uber and Airbnb Meet the Real World, N.Y. TIMES:
THE UPSHOT (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/upshot/when-uber-lyft-
and-airbnb-meet-the-real-world.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/L6D4-BKYG] (describing 
increasing problems encountered by platform apps that use Silicon Valley’s approach to 
business: they seek to “[s]erve as a middleman, employ as few people as possible and 
automate everything”); Scheiber, supra note 8 (discussing potential for platform enterprises 
to use on-demand workers to replace regular employees). 
 14. See, e.g., Laura Lorenzetti, Everything to Know About the Uber Class Action 
Lawsuit, FORTUNE (Sept 2, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/02/uber-lawsuit 
[https://perma.cc/2EWV-QWQ8] (describing the potential consequences of a ruling against 
Uber); see generally N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., AIRBNB IN THE CITY
(2014), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Airbnb%20report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4GYN-DVSB] (describing results of subpoena for information related to 
Airbnb); Erin Mitchell, Uber’s Loophole in the Regulatory System, 6 HOUS. L. REV.: OFF
REC. 75 (2015) (comment) (describing a variety of lawsuits and potential liability actions 
targeted at Uber by riders, drivers, and regulators); Alissa J. Rubin & Mark Scott, Clashes
Erupt Across France As Taxi Drivers Protest Uber, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/business/international/uber-protests-france.html 
[https://perma.cc/7PD5-76EC] (describing protests by taxi drivers and associations against 
Uber for what they call its “economic terrorism”).  For a collection of articles about lawsuits 
against Uber, including the class action lawsuit by Uber drivers, See Uber, HUFFINGTON
POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/uber [https://perma.cc/W5EF-B5YH] 
(newsfeed) (last visited July 17, 2016). 
 15. See Josh Krauss, The Sharing Economy: How State and Local Governments Are 
Failing and Why We Need Congress to Get Involved, 44 SW. L. REV. 365, 373–84 (2014) 
(offering proposals for federal regulation); Hannah A. Posen, Ridesharing in the Sharing 
Economy: Should Regulators Impose Über Regulations on Uber?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 405, 
431 (2015) (note) (proposing experimental regulations for Uber); Catherine Lee Rassman, 
Regulating Rideshare Without Stifling Innovation: Examining the Drivers, the Insurance 
“Gap,” and Why Pennsylvania Should Get on Board, 15 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 81, 97–
99 (2014) (proposing regulations for ridesharing companies in Pennsylvania). 
 16. See Kelly Carlin, The Problems with “Sharing”, MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 15, 2014), 
http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/the-sharewashing-scourge (arguing that the term 
“sharing” is increasingly used to hide business models that are neither socially nor 
environmentally beneficial); Sebastian Olma, Never Mind the Sharing Economy: Here’s 
Platform Capitalism, INST. OF NETWORK CULTURES: BLOG (Oct. 16, 2014), 
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engaged in “greenwashing,” some have suggested that organizations now 
engage in “sharewashing”—claiming illusory benefits related to the sharing 
concept.17
While proponents of regulating the sharing economy suggest a need to 
protect public health, workers, and incumbent businesses as well as to 
protect consumers from deception or unsafe products, opponents of 
regulation argue that government intervention will stifle innovation and 
undermine economic and community benefits.18  The problem with both 
sides of this argument is that advocates and detractors alike often fail to 
address the wide differences among the practices and business entities that 
currently fall under the same umbrella.  Arguably, Uber—with its 
aggressive international growth, venture capital financing, and over $60 
billion valuation19—and a local gardening cooperative present very 
different levels and types of risks requiring regulation.  At the same time, 
the lack of agreement as to the basic definition of what the sharing 
economy is can create confusion and controversy over whether to regulate 
sharing businesses differently from traditional commercial enterprises. 
To address this inappropriate conflation and the resulting confusion 
among consumers and regulators alike, the goals of this article are to define 
the sharing economy as it now stands and to create a taxonomy that 
distinguishes and differentiates the various types of business entities that 
http://networkcultures.org/mycreativity/2014/10/16/never-mind-the-sharing-economy-heres-
platform-capitalism/ [https://perma.cc/95XV-H5ST] (arguing that it is necessary to redefine 
the so-called “sharing” economy to more accurately assess its potential risks and benefits); 
Troncoso, supra note 10 (distinguishing sharing from renting (Airbnb), working 
(TaskRabbit), and surveillance (Facebook), and the downside of linking non-sharing 
practices to the sharing economy). 
 17. See Carlin, supra note 16 (“Sharewashing, when done well, doesn’t just evoke a 
warm generosity. It can conceal ugly things too.”); Troncoso, supra note 10 (suggesting that 
sharewashing “disables the very promise of an economy based on sharing”); Edward T. 
Walker, Beyond the Rhetoric of the Sharing Economy, in On the Sharing Economy,
CONTEXTS: VIEWPOINTS, AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL ASS’N (Feb. 23, 2015), 
https://contexts.org/articles/on-the-sharing-economy/#walker (arguing in favor of renaming 
the sharing economy the “crowdsourcing economy” to avoid “misleading by moralization”). 
 18. See Larry Downes, Lesson from Uber: Why Innovation and Regulation Don’t Mix,
FORBES (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrydownes/2013/02/06/lessons-from-
uber-why-innovation-and-regulation-dont-mix [https://perma.cc/5GD6-MEVU] (suggesting 
that highly-regulated industries, including taxi companies and utilities, lose an incentive to 
innovate, lower prices, and provide good service); Ranchordás, supra note 13, at 442–43 
(noting that regulation can hinder innovation when it places excessive burdens on firms); 
Rassman, supra note 15, at 98 (arguing on behalf of narrowly-tailored regulations to 
“protect drivers and passengers”). 
 19. Eric Newcomer, Uber Raises Funding at $62.5 Billion Valuation, BLOOMBERG
(Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-03/uber-raises-funding-
at-62-5-valuation [https://perma.cc/PK4S-NLA9]. 
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have been lumped into it.  This article then proposes regulatory responses 
to the differing categories in the taxonomy based on the risks they present.  
Among these responses is the recommended creation of a “sharing 
assessment” that would certify entities that meet a threshold criteria, similar 
to B Corporations,20 in order to create more transparent signaling to 
consumers and prevent sharewashing. 
Part I presents the original notion of the sharing economy and 
contrasts this notion with the current, expanded concept.  Part II identifies 
the key risks presented by sharing economy companies.  Based on these 
risks, Part III offers a taxonomy of sharing and suggests regulatory 
responses to each category of the taxonomy.  
In sum, this article will redefine the new sharing economy, analyze its 
regulatory challenges, create a framework that recognizes the differences 
among its constituent elements, and offer regulatory recommendations to 
address the risks and rewards it offers. 
I. WHAT IS THE SHARING ECONOMY, AND WHY DOES IT NEED
REGULATION?
A. The Shifting Definitions of the Sharing Economy 
As with many popular phrases, the origin of the term “sharing 
economy” is unclear.21 Many trace the beginning of the sharing movement 
to a 2010 book titled, What’s Mine is Yours: the Rise of Collaborative 
Consumption, by Rachel Botsman and Roo Rogers, and Botsman’s 
influential TED Talk, The Case for Collaborative Consumption.22 Botsman 
and Rogers defined collaborative consumption (a term the authors 
identified as part of a societal movement toward greater sharing and 
 20. See About B Lab, B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/about-b-
lab (last visited July 20, 2016) [https://perma.cc/R83Y-6XVK]. 
 21. In a 1984 book titled The Share Economy, Martin Weitzman proposed that 
companies share profits with employees to mitigate the effects of so-called “stagflation.” 
Stagflation is defined as a period of both low economic growth and rising inflation. MARTIN
L. WEITZMAN, THE SHARE ECONOMY: CONQUERING STAGFLATION 2 (1984). Although 
related, this does not capture the essence of what we now think of as the sharing economy. 
 22. Rachel Botsman: The Case for Collaborative Consumption, TEDX (May 2010), 
https://www.ted.com/talks/rachel_botsman_the_case_for_collaborative_consumption?langu
age=en [https://perma.cc/6L6A-F43X].  In a 1978 article, authors Marcus Felson and Joe 
Spaeth described “acts of collaborative consumption” as “those events in which one or more 
persons consume economic goods or services in the process of engaging in joint activities 
with one or more others.”  Marcus Felson & Joe L. Spaeth, Community Structure and 
Collaborative Consumption, 21 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 614, 614 (1978).  Felson and 
Spaeth’s examples of collaborative consumption included “drinking beer with friends” and 
“using a washing machine for family laundry.”  Id.
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collaboration) as an alternative to traditional market-based consumption 
and a culture of consumerism.23  They saw collaborative consumption as a 
means of redefining the way people use and own, including “sharing, 
bartering, lending, renting, gifting, and swapping.”24
The purpose of participating in this form of consumption was to “save 
money, space, and time; make new friends; and become active citizens 
once again.”25 Botsman and Rogers explicitly linked collaborative 
consumption to positive social change. The authors note that, 
“[collaborative] systems provide significant environmental benefits by 
increasing use efficiency, reducing waste, encouraging the development of 
better products, and mopping up the surplus created by over-production and 
consumption.”26
Academic papers discussing the sharing economy typically provide 
general definitions of the term that mirror the attributes offered by Botsman 
and Rogers, often with an emphasis on the personal nature of the 
transaction.27 As Janelle Orsi, a prominent scholar and attorney in the 
sharing field, puts it: “Although it is hard to encapsulate the qualities of this 
new economy, it generally facilitates community ownership, localized 
 23. BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 11, at xv. 
 24. Id.
 25. Id. at xv–xvi.  In 2011, Danielle Sacks, writing for popular technology and business 
magazine Fast Company, similarly emphasized the potential of the sharing industry to 
disrupt traditional consumption patterns and consequently retail enterprises. See Danielle 
Sacks, The Sharing Economy, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 18, 2011), www.fastcompany.com/ 
1747551/sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/2L27-9RQ6] (“Now that the sharing economy 
is gaining the backing of the financial community, corporations from car manufacturers to 
big-box retailers better start paying attention.”). 
 26. BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 11, at xv–xvi. 
 27. See, e.g., Ranchordás, supra note 13, at 416 (“The sharing economy presupposes 
two elements: the existence of physical ‘shareable goods that systematically have excess 
capacity’ and a sharing attitude or motivation.”) (quoting Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: 
On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing As A Modality of Economic Production,
114 YALE L.J. 273, 276 (2004)); Molly Cohen & Corey Zehngebot, What’s Old Becomes 
New: Regulating the Sharing Economy, 58 BOSTON B.J. Spring 2014 at 6, 6 (defining the 
sharing economy as “the internet-based sharing of underutilized space, skills, and stuff for 
monetary and non-monetary benefits”); SHUFORD, supra note 7, at 302 (“The sharing 
economy business model is based around the principle of using personal resources more 
efficiently. . . . [S]haring economy companies act as online forums for people to advertise 
their available resources.”); Chris J. Martin, Paul Upham & Leslie Budd, Commercial 
Orientation in Grassroots Social Innovation: Insights from the Sharing Economy, 118 
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 240, 240 (2015) (noting that “[i]n practice the terms sharing economy 
and collaborative consumption tend to be used interchangeably”); see also Bronwen Morgan 
& Declan Kuch, Radical Transactionalism: Legal Consciousness, Diverse Economies, and 
the Sharing Economy, 42 J.L. SOC’Y 556, 557 (2015) (arguing that the definition of the 
sharing economy must include initiatives and innovations that “mix elements of activism 
and enterprise”). 
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production, sharing, cooperation, [and] small-scale enterprise.”28 Other 
definitions focus on the sharing economy as a means of putting 
underutilized personal assets to work.29 As Cannon and Chang note, “the 
sharing economy refers to bringing to market goods and labor that are 
otherwise unutilized during certain time periods.”30
Another key component of the sharing economy identified by many 
commentators is the peer-to-peer (P2P) aspect of sharing enterprises and 
the way in which web-based applications enable individuals to 
communicate and collaborate more effectively and efficiently than ever 
before.31  A 2014 report by Debbie Wosskow, for example, broadly 
“defin[es] the sharing economy as online platforms that help people share 
access to assets, resources, time and skills.”32
 28. Janelle Orsi, Practicing Law in the Sharing Economy: Helping People Build 
Cooperatives, Social Enterprise, and Local Sustainable Economies 2 (2012). 
 29. See, e.g., Rassman, supra note 15, at 81 (describing the sharing economy as “rooted 
in the allocation of underutilized space, skills, and goods by ‘matching providers who have 
specific assets or skills with the people who need them’”) (quoting Arun Sundararajan, Why 
the Government Doesn’t Need to Regulate the Sharing Economy, WIRED (Oct. 21, 2012, 
1:45 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/10/from-airbnb-to-coursera-why-the-government-
shouldnt-regulate-the-sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/QYM2-NUWM]); POSEN, supra
note 15, at 407 (“Essential to this new sharing economy is the idea that the consumer does 
not need everything; rather, ‘we can access these resources when we need them, and only 
pay for what we use.’”) (quoting James Gardner, What Is the New Sharing Economy?,
FORBES (July 30, 2013, 11:59 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/emc/2013/07/30/what-is-
the-new-sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/5YH4-76G7]). 
 30. Bryant Cannon & Hanna Chung, A Framework for Designing Co-Regulation 
Models Well-Adapted to Technology-Facilitated Sharing Economies, 31 SANTA CLARA
HIGH TECH. L.J. 23, 25 (2015). 
 31. See, e.g., Talia G. Loucks, Travelers Beware: Tort Liability in the Sharing 
Economy, 10 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 329, 330 (2015) (“The sharing economy is an 
offspring of the peer-to-peer business model that has grown in importance in recent years.”); 
RASSMAN, supra note 15, at 81 (noting that “the sharing economy owes much of its success 
to advances in peer-to-peer technology”); POSEN, supra note 15, at 407 (“Technology and 
innovation are central to the sharing economy, which focuses on finding ways to accomplish 
things quickly and easily.”). 
 32. Debbie Wosskow, Unlocking the Sharing Economy: An Independent Review,
GOV.UK 13 (2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ 
data/file/378291/bis-14-1227-unlocking-the-sharing-economy-an-independent-review.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JQ3Y-T22P]. 
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FIGURE 1
Figure 1 depicts the essential characteristics of the original sharing 
economy as proposed by Botsman and Rogers and as seen in much of the 
academic literature: reduced and redefined consumption of goods and 
services, P2P transactions, and a web-based platform.  The reduced and 
redefined consumption component is explicitly tied to a societal benefit, 
which is generally environmental protection, community-building, or both. 
Popular definitions of the sharing economy often focus on its shift 
away from traditional notions of private, individual ownership and toward a 
more fluid recirculation of goods and services.33 Whereas previous 
generations bought their own music, cars, and clothes, consumers today are 
more likely to turn to the sharing economy to get temporary access to the 
same things.  For example, one blogger describes her clothing expenditures 
this way: “For $54 a month, Le Tote sends me three articles of clothing and 
two pieces of jewelry.  I wear them as long as I want.  Then whenever I’m 
ready for a change, I send them back in a pre-addressed envelope, and wait 
 33. See Sacks, supra note 25 (proposing that the basic characteristic of sharing 
economy businesses “is that they extract value out of the stuff we already have”); Giana M. 
Eckhardt & Fleura Bardhi, The Sharing Economy Isn’t About Sharing at All, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Jan. 28, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/01/the-sharing-economy-isnt-about-sharing-at-all 
[https://perma.cc/G3YK-384G] [hereinafter Eckhardt & Bardhi, The Sharing Economy]
(“[C]onsumers are paying to access someone else’s goods or services for a particular period 
of time.”). 
Original 
sharing 
economy 
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for my next batch.”34
Instead of buying a car, consumers today may gain short-term access 
to a car through a car-sharing service like Zipcar or simply get a ride from 
Uber.  Rather than owning music, consumers can gain access through 
streaming services like Spotify and Pandora.35 The popularity of the sharing 
economy is evident from the rapid growth of these companies and the 
astronomical valuation of many of them, exemplified by Uber’s more than 
$60 billion valuation.36
Whatever definition is offered, certain entities now considered 
prototypical examples of the sharing economy include Uber, Airbnb, and 
TaskRabbit.  The most commonly identified sectors of the sharing 
economy include transportation, housing, workspaces, food, goods, and 
jobs.37 Examples of companies that are touted as, or tout themselves as, 
members of the sharing economy include: 
• Uber and Lyft, “ridesharing” platforms that pair drivers with 
their own vehicles with individuals seeking a ride and 
facilitate online payments;38
• Zipcar, a car-sharing service that allows members to book cars 
for shorter periods and in more convenient locations than 
traditional car rental companies;39
• Bike-sharing platforms that allow individuals to use shared 
bicycles under different pricing schedules in several cities, 
 34. Whiteside, supra note 2. 
 35. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 4, at 5, 14–15; About Pandora,
PANDORA, http://www.pandora.com/about [https://perma.cc/TA29-TDPG] (last visited July 
18, 2016) (describing Pandora’s music-streaming service); About Us, SPOTIFY,
https://www.spotify.com/us/about-us/contact [https://perma.cc/TUF3-5KLT] (last visited 
July 18, 2016) (describing Spotify’s music-streaming service). 
 36. See Newcomer, supra note 19 (noting Uber’s $62.5 billion valuation). 
 37. See generally SHAREABLE & SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES LAW CTR., POLICIES FOR 
SHAREABLE CITIES: A SHARING ECONOMY POLICY PRIMER FOR URBAN LEADERS (2013),
http://www.shareable.net/download-your-copy-of-policies-for-shareable-cities
[https://perma.cc/PS47-P8Y3] [hereinafter SHAREABLE] (breaking down recommendations 
by transportation, housing, food, and job creation); DAMIEN DEMAILLY & ANNE-SOPHIE
NOVEL, THE SHARING ECONOMY: MAKE IT SUSTAINABLE 7 (2014), available at
http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Economie-du-partage-enjeux-et-opportunites-pour-la-
transition-ecologique [https://perma.cc/BW9A-3VCW] (discussing shareable goods); 
Wosskow, supra note 32, at 25–38 (identifying sectors as: shared space and 
accommodation; tasks, time, and skills; transportation; and others including clothing, food, 
items, and logistics). 
 38. UBER, https://www.uber.com [https://perma.cc/2WKG-7PBR] (last visited July 18, 
2016); LYFT, https://www.lyft.com [https://perma.cc/SP9C-8DM8] (last visited July 18, 
2016).
 39. ZIPCAR, http://www.zipcar.com [https://perma.cc/P75F-87QN] (last visited July 18, 
2016).
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such as New York City’s Citi Bike and Washington, D.C.’s 
Capital Bikeshare;40
• Airbnb, HomeAway, and Vacation Rentals by Owner 
(VRBO), platforms that allow individuals to rent spare rooms, 
apartments, houses, or vacation homes for short periods of 
time;41
• TaskRabbit and UpWork, platforms that pair individuals 
available to work with those needing tasks performed;42
• Tradesy, thredUP, Poshmark, The RealReal, and Vestiaire 
Collective, online clothing stores that purchase and resell 
certain types of used clothes and accessories from individuals 
who can “cash out” or use their balance to purchase other 
items on the site;43
• Le Tote, a company that rents out totes filled with clothing 
and accessories, customized for each customer, for a monthly 
fee;44
• Rent the Runway, a company that rents high-end clothing to 
its customers;45
• Rocksbox, a company that curates a personalized selection of 
 40. CITI BIKE, https://www.citibikenyc.com [https://perma.cc/L752-SXXZ] (last visited 
July 18, 2016); CAPITAL BIKESHARE, https://www.capitalbikeshare.com 
[https://perma.cc/UT4S-X2UC] (last visited July 18, 2016). 
 41. AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com [https://perma.cc/8T7A-7R99] (last visited July 
18, 2016); HOMEAWAY, https://www.homeaway.com [https://perma.cc/3L2R-4LZU] (last 
visited July 18, 2016); VRBO, https://www.vrbo.com [https://perma.cc/QEW9-WCPE] (last 
visited July 18, 2016). 
 42. TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com [https://perma.cc/RWD3-FD23] (last
visited July 18, 2016); UPWORK, https://www.upwork.com [https://perma.cc/AZY9-XVPE] 
(last visited July 18, 2016). 
 43. THREDUP, https://www.thredup.com [https://perma.cc/7L7Y-UAA9] (last visited 
July 18, 2016) (marketing its business as an online consignment and thrift store); TRADESY,
https://www.tradesy.com [https://perma.cc/X7RW-A5DZ] (last visited July 18, 2016) 
(promoting its clothing business as part of the “collaborative economy”); POSHMARK,
https://poshmark.com [https://perma.cc/WS2R-TRP5] (last visited July 18, 2016) (pledging 
to focus on “offering a one-of-a-kind unique experience in connecting people and their 
closets”); THE REALREAL, https://www.therealreal.com [https://perma.cc/97J6-45R2] (last 
visited July 18, 2016) (operating an online luxury consignment shop); VESTIAIRE
COLLECTIVE, http://www.vestiairecollective.com [https://perma.cc/E94T-DA2S] (last visited 
July 18, 2016) (offering customers the opportunity to access and sell items in its 
“community of fashion lovers”). 
 44. LE TOTE, https://letote.com [https://perma.cc/6PWJ-662E] (last visited July 18, 
2016) (promoting its business as one that allows women to borrow and wear top brands). 
 45. RENT THE RUNWAY, https://www.renttherunway.com [https://perma.cc/7G86-3FJF] 
(last visited July 18, 2016) (allowing subscribers to rent designer clothing for special 
events).
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rental jewelry and charges customers on a monthly basis;46
• Netflix, Amazon Prime Video, and Hulu, online streaming 
services for television and movies;47
• Spotify, Amazon Prime Music, Apple Music, and Pandora, 
online streaming services for music;48
• ToysTrunk and Pley, toy rental companies offering their 
selections online;49
• Booksfree, a subscription-based rental service for books and 
audiobooks;50
• Parking Panda, an app that allows users to compare and 
reserve parking spaces in more than forty cities;51
• Care.com, a platform facilitating access to care providers for 
children, seniors, and pets, and well as for housekeepers;52
• WeWork, a company offering short-term access to 
commercial office space;53
• Handy, a web-based platform allowing customers to hire 
home cleaners and handymen that are background-checked 
 46. ROCKSBOX, https://www.rocksbox.com [https://perma.cc/Y7ZC-U2FQ] (last visited 
July 18, 2016) (promising customers access to “the ultimate jewelry collection”). 
 47. HULU, http://www.hulu.com [https://perma.cc/8LBW-4J6S] (last visited July 18, 
2016) (offering free one-month trial for television and movie streaming service); NETFLIX,
https://www.netflix.com [https://perma.cc/S3FY-3GL8] (last visited July 18, 2016) (offering 
the opportunity to watch anywhere); Prime Instant Video, AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/Prime-Instant-Video/b/ref=primedp_piv?ie=UTF8&node= 
2676882011 [https://perma.cc/FS7P-4W8W] (last visited July 18, 2016) (offering Amazon 
Prime subscribers a wide selection of movies as part of their membership). 
 48. APPLE MUSIC, http://www.apple.com/music [https://perma.cc/LBW7-J4M8] (last 
visited July 18, 2016) (offering monthly membership to listeners); PANDORA,
http://www.pandora.com [https://perma.cc/KA7A-6R8P] (last visited July 18, 2016) 
(offering an internet radio service); Prime Instant Music, AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/gp/feature.html?ie=UTF8&docId=1002557791 
[https://perma.cc/Q3M8-XP98] (last visited July 18, 2016) (including music streaming as 
part of a Prime membership); SPOTIFY, https://www.spotify.com [https://perma.cc/UR63-
HX6F] (last visited July 18, 2016) (streaming “music for everyone”). 
 49. PLEY, https://www.pley.com [https://perma.cc/7VV4-F9ST] (last visited July 18, 
2016) (touting itself as a monthly toy club); TOYSTRUNK, http://www.toystrunk.com 
[https://perma.cc/7VRY-ET7E] (last visited July 18, 2016) (offering a toy rental service). 
 50. BOOKSFREE, http://www.booksfree.com [https://perma.cc/ZJ9K-SZYM] (last visited 
July 18, 2016) (providing members with access to unlimited books or audiobooks). 
 51. PARKING PANDA, https://www.parkingpanda.com [https://perma.cc/9MVS-F45Q] 
(last visited July 18, 2016) (guaranteeing parking for members in select cities). 
 52. CARE.COM, https://www.care.com [https://perma.cc/8ADP-ALY7] (last visited July 
18, 2016) (offering caregiving services). 
 53. WEWORK, https://www.wework.com [https://perma.cc/A8J6-QRJ9] (last visited 
July 18, 2016) (offering services to help grow businesses). 
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and insured;54
• Rinse, a laundry and dry-cleaning service that allows users to 
schedule pick-ups and deliveries online within a selected 
timeframe;55
• Craigslist, an online community that facilitates peer-to-peer 
transactions of all kinds, from employment to housing to sales 
of personal items, on a regional basis;56
• Etsy, an online marketplace for artists, crafters, designers, and 
sellers of vintage items;57
• 1stdibs, an online antiques market that allows customers to 
shop by item type, style, and dealer location;58
• FarmersWeb, a platform that puts local food buyers in touch 
with small farmers;59
• Flickr, a platform that allows people to upload and share 
photographs,60 including photos under a Creative Commons 
license, which allows for greater sharing and collaboration;61
and
• Tool-sharing collectives that act as local tool-lending libraries 
in several cities.62
 54. HANDY, https://www.handy.com/about [https://perma.cc/K33K-8JNK] (last visited 
July 18, 2016) (explaining that “Handy is the leading platform for connecting individuals 
looking for household services with top-quality, pre-screened independent service 
professionals. From home cleaning to handyman services, Handy instantly matches 
thousands of customers every week with trusted professionals in cities all around the 
world”). 
 55. RINSE, https://www.rinse.com/ [https://perma.cc/T6DZ-VV2F] (last visited Jan. 23, 
2017) (providing valet service in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Washington D.C.). 
 56. CRAIGSLIST, http://www.craigslist.org [https://perma.cc/DY9Z-K5PX] (last visited 
July 18, 2016) (listing posts for housing, sales, jobs, services, gigs, and resumes, as well as 
discussion forums, personal ads, and community-related topics). 
 57. ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/about [https://perma.cc/CGX4-CWHZ] (last visited 
July 18, 2016) (describing the business as “a marketplace where people around the world 
connect, both online and offline, to make, sell and buy unique goods”). 
 58. 1STDIBS, https://www.1stdibs.com [https://perma.cc/FGW2-TM7W] (last visited 
July 18, 2016) (describing an offering one-of-a-kind and made-to-order pieces). 
 59. FARMERSWEB, https://www.farmersweb.com [https://perma.cc/WQJ9-F3AJ] (last 
visited July 18, 2016) (describing an offering software to farmers). 
 60. FLICKR, https://www.flickr.com [https://perma.cc/W2TW-P8RE] (last visited July 
18, 2016) (showcasing the touting of its community of 120 million people and collection of 
13 billion photos). 
 61. What We Do: What Is Creative Commons?, CREATIVE COMMONS,
https://creativecommons.org/about [https://perma.cc/H9HV-GLL5] (last visited July 18, 
2016) (describing the provision of “free, easy-to-use copyright licenses to make a simple 
and standardized way to give the public permission to share and use your creative work–on 
conditions of your choice”). 
 62. See, e.g., NE SEATTLE TOOL LIBRARY, About Us, http://neseattletoollibrary.org/ 
39083 ple_19-3 S
heet N
o. 28 S
ide B
      05/11/2017   10:58:06
39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 28 Side B      05/11/2017   10:58:06
C M
Y K
2_SCOTT_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/17 5:32 PM
566 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 19:3 
As will be discussed in the next part, the range of business models that 
ostensibly belong to the new sharing economy is far broader than the range 
first described by Botsman and Rogers and echoed by their academic peers. 
It encompasses goods and services, housing and media, large and small 
businesses, and local and international operations. One consequence of this 
expansive range is the need to ensure that these new businesses are 
regulated appropriately. 
B. Redefining the New Sharing Economy for Better Regulation 
In order to categorize the components of the sharing economy, and 
therefore facilitate its effective regulation, we must examine how the 
sharing economy has evolved from its earlier characterizations. This 
section focuses on how the term “sharing economy” has expanded to cover 
a broader range of business types than first imagined. 
Botsman and Rogers’s description of collaborative consumption 
encapsulates the original sharing economy. Botsman and Rogers saw 
collaborative consumption as a reaction to a growing culture of 
overconsumption, which had led to environmental degradation and 
increasing levels of individual disassociation and loss of communities.63
They argued that the world had reached a collective “tipping point” and 
that people were “starting to recognize that the collective quest for material 
things [had] come at the expense of impoverishing relationships with 
friends, family, neighbors, and the planet.”64 The twin goals of building 
relationships and reducing consumption were aided and mirrored by the 
growth of online and Internet-based communities, which created systems 
for building trust and collaboration in the absence of face-to-face contact 
and relationships.65
Collaborative consumption focused on access instead of ownership as 
a means for increasing the use of underutilized goods.66 Systems of 
bartering, exchanges of goods and services, and genuine sharing of 
resources—like garden space—were intended to allow for more efficient 
aboutus/ [https://perma.cc/HFL2-F7NC] (last visited July 18, 2016) (providing community 
access to a wide variety of tools, training, and sustainable resources). 
 63. BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 11, at 43–44, 54–55. 
 64. Id. at 44. 
 65. Id. at xx (“Indeed, we believe people will look back and recognize that 
Collaborative Consumption started online—by posting comments and sharing files, codes, 
photos, videos, and knowledge. And we have not reached a powerful inflection point, where 
we are starting to apply the same collaborative principles and sharing behaviors to other 
physical areas of our everyday lives.”). 
 66. Id. at 71-73 (describing a “‘usage mind-set’ whereby they pay for the benefit of a 
product—what it does for them—without needing to own the product outright”). 
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use of resources.67 Another key aspect of this new form of consumption 
was the decentralized nature of the transactions.68 Internet-based platforms 
helped individuals to communicate directly with other individuals to sell 
used items that would otherwise end up in a landfill or offer services that 
would otherwise only be available through a formal employment contract. 
Notions of the “sharing economy” today, however, often look quite 
different from this idealistic paradigm. Uber, the prototypical sharing 
enterprise, resembles a multinational taxi service more than a community-
based car-sharing collective. Airbnb, once billed as a way to share unused 
rooms in a private residence, now includes many homes and apartments 
dedicated to commercial use.69 Conversations about the sharing economy 
may now also include Netflix (a video-streaming service), Rent the 
Runway (rentals of designer clothing from a commercial enterprise), 
WeWork (short-term rentals of commercial office space), and Zipcar (the 
Avis company that provides short-term car rentals).70 None of these 
 67. Id. at 73. 
 68. Id. at 92 (“Collaborative Consumption eliminates the need for. . . .middlemen. With 
an infinite marketplace for direct peer-to-peer exchanges, the role of the middleman is no 
longer to police the trade False Just as Rob Kalin recognized with Etsy and the founders of 
Airbnb envisioned, the role of their companies is to act as curators and ambassadors, 
creating platforms that facilitate self-managed exchanges and contributions.”). 
 69. See Heather Scheiwe Kulp & Amanda L. Kool, You Help Me, He Helps You: 
Dispute Systems Design in the Sharing Economy, 48 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 179, 197 (2015) 
(noting that “38 percent of Airbnb’s revenue for 2013 came from units that were rented out 
without the host present for a total of six or more months during the year”). 
 70. Today’s sharing economy has also been linked to a social trend toward the 
development of collaboration and sharing across multiple areas of society. Many 
commentators, including Botsman and Rogers, link the growth of collaborative consumption 
to sharing in non-commercial and non-consumptive areas of people’s lives, including social 
media and social networking websites and applications like Facebook, Instagram, and Pipo. 
BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 11 at xx.  Some include collaborative open-source software 
projects, like Linux, and collaborative information-sharing sites, like Wikipedia and Quora, 
as part of the sharing economy. See, e.g., Lucille A. Jewel, The Indie Lawyer of the Future: 
How New Technology, Cultural Trends, and Market Forces Can Transform the Solo 
Practice of Law, 17 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 325, 338–39 (2014) (“Sharing and 
collaborating are the hallmarks of participatory culture. New technology has created a 
marked ‘increase in our ability to share, to cooperate with one another, and to take collective 
action, all outside the framework of traditional institutions and organizations.’ False Clay 
Shirky offers Wikipedia and Linux as examples of successful projects that have capitalized 
on people’s desire to collectively participate and contribute to reach an end goal.”) (quoting 
CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT
ORGANIZATIONS 20–21 (2008)).  A movement toward “sharing cities” seeks to encourage 
trust and collaboration within cities to build community, increase efficiency, and improve 
the environment.  Sharing cities could even unite to form a “Sharing World” to improve the 
lives of people around the globe; Lawrence Lessig, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE
THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY 177 (2008) (describing a “hybrid economy” as “either a 
commercial entity that aims to leverage value from a sharing economy, or False a sharing 
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enterprises looks precisely like Botsman and Rogers’s antidote to consumer 
culture.
First, transactions in the new sharing economy are not necessarily, or 
even primarily, P2P.  Rent the Runway, for example, relies on an Internet-
based platform to increase the consumption of underutilized assets (i.e., 
formal dresses), but the customer rents the dress directly from a large 
commercial enterprise with over five hundred employees and “the largest 
dry cleaning operation in the U.S.”71
Second, while many of the new sharing economy companies are based 
on non-traditional forms of consumption, including shared access rather 
than private ownership, this focus does not necessarily grow out of a social 
mission.  Instead, the value proposition of the new enterprises is just as 
likely to be efficiency, time-saving, or an opportunity to earn money 
outside of traditional employment settings, either through selling access to 
assets or offering services.72  For example, the stated goal of the founders 
of Handy.com is to be “the easiest, most convenient way to book home 
services.”73
Even when new companies offer redefined methods of consumption, 
their business models may not further the original sharing economy 
mission.  In direct opposition to the original goal of reducing consumption, 
some of the new sharing economy companies facilitate increased
economy that builds upon a commercial entity to better supports its sharing aims”).  See
Adam Parsons, The Sharing Economy: A Short Introduction to its Political Evolution,
SHARE THE WORLD’S RESOURCES (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.sharing.org/information-
centre/articles/sharing-economy-short-introduction-its-political-evolution 
[https://perma.cc/LK76-MKZH].  The expansion of the concept of collaborative 
consumption into non-commercial, social contexts suggests that what was once seen as an 
effort to provide alternatives to private ownership is now a cultural trend with much broader 
social implications. The overlap between redefined methods of consumption and reordering 
of social relationships and methods of interaction in both commercial and social realms may 
explain why it is so challenging to define the sharing economy. In this paper, we focus on 
one aspect of this varied notion of sharing—sharing enterprises devoted to consumption of 
goods and services, including food, housing, media, and transportation—rather than trying 
to incorporate or define other cultural and social expressions of sharing. 
 71. About, RENT THE RUNWAY, https://www.renttherunway.com/pages/about 
[https://perma.cc/3ZQE-W4X3] (last visited July 18, 2016). 
 72. Professors Eckhardt and Bardhi argue that consumers are not interested in the 
original sharing economy mission: “It is an economic exchange, and consumers are after 
utilitarian, rather than social, value.”  Eckhardt & Bardhi, The Sharing Economy, supra note 
33.  Other recent analyses of sharing as a business model agree: “[R]esearch suggests that 
the major consumer motivation is self-oriented. Specifically, consumers prefer the lower 
costs that the leading companies in the sharing economy tend to provide.”  Matzler, Kurt, 
Veider, Viktoria & Kathan, Wolfgang, Adapting to the Sharing Economy, 56 MIT SLOAN
MGMT. REV. 71, 72 (Winter 2015). 
 73. HANDY, supra note 54. 
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consumption by reducing the cost of goods and allowing consumers a 
continual supply of new items.74  Rent the Runway, for example, promises 
customers a way to “Stay Chic, Effortlessly” with its clothing rental 
subscription.75  Or, as Pley, a toy rental company puts it: “With Pley, your 
children are never bored. It’s like Christmas every week.”76  Many of these 
rental companies offer subscribers the option of buying the pieces they 
rent.  Rocksbox, a jewelry rental business, allows customers to keep any of 
the items they rent and the company bills them accordingly if they do.77
Finally, it is worth noting that many of the enterprises that are 
commonly characterized as part of the “sharing economy” do not actually 
include sharing, and their business model involves nothing more than short-
term rentals.  When Zipcar launched in Boston and Cambridge in June of 
2000, the company was touted as an example of the new sharing 
economy’s focus on access over ownership.78  Today, Zipcar has over 
11,000 cars, is operated as a subsidiary of the Avis Budget Group, and is 
distinguishable from Avis’s traditional rental car service only by the 
decentralized locations of the cars, the rental units (hours versus days), and 
the exclusive use of an Internet platform for reservations.79  Etsy, which is 
also included in many sharing economy discussions,80 provides a platform 
 74. Ucilia Wang, How the Netflix Model Impacts the Environment, Economy and 
Society, GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/ 
2014/feb/06/how-the-netflix-model-impacts-the-environment-economy-and-society
[https://perma.cc/LT38-UWR9] (discussing the mixed environmental impacts of collective 
consumption and “sharing” models, including Netflix); see DEMAILLY & NOVEL, supra note 
37, at 11–22 (seeking to quantify benefits and environmental impacts of sharing). 
 75. Unlimited, RENT THE RUNWAY, https://www.renttherunway.com/unlimited 
[https://perma.cc/F5R7-CCAM] (last visited July 18, 2016). 
 76. What is Pley?, PLEY, https://www.pley.com/toy-rental [https://perma.cc/M59L-
38SR] (last visited July 18, 2016). 
 77. FAQs, ROCKSBOX, https://www.rocksbox.com/faq [https://perma.cc/3ASC-LRSM] 
(last visited July 18, 2016). 
 78. See Kellen Zale, Sharing Property, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 579 (2016) (noting 
“that an expansive view of the sharing economy might include business-to-consumer 
transactions, as well as peer-to-peer ones, as long as the transactions involve the provision 
of access as opposed to ownership. For example, a business-to-consumer company like 
Zipcar may be considered by some to be part of the sharing economy; however, traditional 
business-to-consumer car rental companies like Hertz and Avis are usually not.”); see also
Arun Sundararajan, From Zipcar to the Sharing Economy, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 3, 2013) 
(stating that while companies like Zipcar “pioneered the creative use of technology to open 
up flexible new ways of renting a car,” such companies are distinguishable from companies 
like RelayRides and Getaround which are “genuine peer-to-peer car rental marketplaces.”). 
 79. Tim Worstall, Explaining the Avis Takeover of Zipcar, FORBES (Jan. 2, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/01/02/explaining-the-avis-takeover-of-
zipcar/#5135f35d35b0 [https://perma.cc/NS3Y-RK79]. 
 80. See, e.g., Wosskow, supra note 32, at 13 (including Etsy as a business that fits the 
definition of sharing economy).  Rachel Botsman suggests calling TaskRabbit and Etsy part 
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to connect individual artists and craftspeople with buyers, but the 
transactions are for ownership, not shared, rented, or bartered access to 
goods.  WeWork, the latest darling of venture capitalists commonly labeled 
as a form of sharing enterprise, furnishes and rents individual or group 
office spaces in month-long intervals.81  Put simply, there is no “sharing” in 
the millions of transactions that take place on these and many other so-
called “sharing” platforms. 
If the old labels no longer apply, what do today’s sharing economy 
companies have in common?  First, we find that sharing economy 
companies use an Internet platform to centralize and facilitate access to 
goods and services more directly and more flexibly than more traditional 
forms of business.  Where consumers could have found ways to share 
assets or work directly with independent tradespeople in the past, these 
would have been time consuming and risky pursuits. Today’s Internet 
platforms reduce consumers’ expenditures of time and/or money, making it 
quicker and easier for individuals to gain access to the goods and services 
they want without becoming mired in unnecessary analysis or long-term 
ownership.82
Second, we find that the companies commonly considered a part of 
the sharing economy operate in one of three distinct areas, each with a 
particular twist on the traditional commercial business model: 1) reduced 
and/or redefined consumption of goods, with a focus on access over 
ownership; 2) on-demand and short-term services using a P2P model; and 
3) access to, rather than ownership of, shared space, including housing, 
commercial space, and land.83
of the “collaborative economy,” defining this as “[a]n economic system of decentralized 
networks and marketplaces that unlocks the value of underused assets by matching needs 
and haves, in ways that bypass traditional middlemen.” Rachel Botsman, Defining The 
Sharing Economy: What Is Collaborative Consumption—And What Isn’t?, FAST COMPANY
(May 27, 2015), http://www.fastcoexist.com/3046119/defining-the-sharing-economy-what-
is-collaborative-consumption-and-what-isnt [https://perma.cc/KF3V-RTLK]. 
 81. See Sramana Mitra, How WeWork Is Riding the Sharing Economy Wave, INC. (Jun.
10, 2016), http://www.inc.com/linkedin/sramana-mitra/billion-dollar-unicorn-wework-
riding-sharing-economy-wave-mitra.html [https://perma.cc/354Z-YZST] (providing an 
overview of WeWork’s offerings and financials). 
 82. Some analysts have suggested it is the lower transaction costs and smaller units of 
consumption in the rental and service industries that characterizes the sharing economy.  See
Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, But for Local Government Law: The 
Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 901, 912 (2015) 
(stating that the sharing economy “relies on a single dynamic: a stark reduction in 
transaction costs that allows for radically disaggregated consumption”).
 83. These three categories are explored in further detail infra in Part III.A.  Some 
academics have reduced the categories of the sharing economy to two. See Rauch & 
Schleicher, supra note 82, at 903 (“In general, sharing firms either (1) own goods or 
services that they rent to customers on a short-term basis or (2) create peer-to-peer platforms 
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Third, we find that sharing economy companies create some avenue 
for individually-tailored experiences that allow users/consumers to feel 
more engaged in their transactions yet at the same time provide curation of 
goods and services to meet a need for convenience and efficiency.  
Curation may be achieved through algorithms that allow for “customized” 
platform transactions, as in the case of Le Tote, which allows users to 
create a “Style Profile” that leads to customized recommendations for each 
new shipment of rental clothing.84  In the on-demand services category, 
platforms may screen and select service providers, as is the case with 
Handy.com or may provide tools for users to perform these tasks.85  At 
Care.com, users can easily order a background check, check references, 
and read reviews of service providers before making their own selections.86
Curation and efficiency may be particularly attractive to harried 
consumers who want access to P2P networks and services but also want to 
have streamlined decision-making and some assurance of quality and 
reliability.  Etsy allows customers to connect directly with artisans, crafters, 
and dealers of vintage goods, but Etsy sellers must meet certain criteria to 
be listed on the site.87  Similarly, before dealers can list their wares on 
1stdibs, one of the Internet’s most prominent marketplaces for antiques, 
they must be qualified by 1stdibs, and each item they list must be 
photographed in accordance with certain specifications.88  1stdibs warns 
prospective applicants that it “select[s] only prestigious dealers and 
galleries” to sell on its site.89
Some platforms like TaskRabbit rely on a mix of curation and 
customer reviews to ensure quality and satisfaction of users.90  At the other 
end of the spectrum, sites like Craigslist provide only minimal curation, 
allowing anyone who agrees to its Terms of Service to buy or sell items, 
connecting providers and users for short-term exchanges of goods or services.”). 
 84. My Closet vs. Style Profile, LE TOTE, https://letote.zendesk.com/hc/en-
us/articles/204180230-My-Closet-vs-Style-Profile [https://perma.cc/K634-2ZMY] (last
visited July 18, 2016) (“When you complete your Style Profile you give us the skinny on 
your look and tell us what type of clothing and accessories to send your way.”). 
 85. Services, HANDY, https://www.handy.com/services [https://perma.cc/WXN2-SFYE] 
(last visited July 18, 2016). 
 86. CARE, supra note 52. 
 87. Seller Policy, ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/legal/sellers [https://perma.cc/ZRW2-
9U4W] (last visited July 18, 2016). 
 88. We Invite You to Join Us, 1STDIBS, https://www.1stdibs.com/dealer/application-
form/ [https://perma.cc/F24E-QSKP] (last visited July 18, 2016). 
 89. Id.
 90. How It Works, TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com/how-it-works 
[https://perma.cc/53WZ-UCKE] (last visited July 18, 2016) (“Our Taskers undergo an 
extensive background check and in-person onboarding before joining the TaskRabbit 
community. They’re professional, highly rated, and always ready to lend a hand.”). 
39083 ple_19-3 S
heet N
o. 31 S
ide B
      05/11/2017   10:58:06
39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 31 Side B      05/11/2017   10:58:06
C M
Y K
2_SCOTT_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/17 5:32 PM
572 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 19:3 
look for an employer or employee, find a roommate, and make other kinds 
of connections through its site.91
Given the distance that the original sharing economy has traveled and 
the diverse nature of entities now included under its umbrella, many have 
argued for a renaming of the sharing economy to something broader, such 
as the platform economy, gig-economy, or access economy.92  While we 
agree that these terms capture aspects of the new sharing economy 
companies, we also believe the term “sharing economy” remains relevant 
as a means of distinguishing between commercial enterprises that simply 
utilize an Internet platform to enable transactions or provide temporary 
services and those entities that maintain some connection to the original 
sharing impulse, either through redefined methods of consumption or a 
democratization and decentralization of commerce through P2P 
transactions.  Rather than eliminating the term, we believe it is useful to 
capture the current understanding of the term through redefinition and 
refinement. 
II. THE CHALLENGES OF REGULATING THE SHARING ECONOMY
As the number of sharing economy companies grows, so do the risks 
to workers and the public. There are risks, for example, to the public from 
unskilled or unsafe labor. This risk is exacerbated when the public 
presumes service providers have a certain level of training and/or 
qualifications based on the imprimatur of the platform through which their 
services are offered. This has proven to be a significant issue with car-
sharing companies Uber and Lyft.93
Other risks are attendant to the classification of service providers as 
independent contractors. These risks include no guarantee of minimum 
wages, protection from discrimination, and access to employment 
benefits.94 A third set of risks concerns the impact of sharing economy 
companies on local communities, as illustrated by the effect of hundreds of 
new “innkeepers” enabled by Airbnb on formerly residential 
communities.95 There is also the risk that consumers will assume that 
sharing economy companies share the social mission that was at the root of 
many early sharing company entities but is no longer a common 
 91. Terms of Use, CRAIGSLIST, https://www.craigslist.org/about/terms.of.use 
[https://perma.cc/26XY-APLQ] (last visited July 18, 2016). 
 92. See, e.g., Eckhardt & Bardhi, The Sharing Economy, supra note 33 (arguing the 
sharing economy is more properly considered an “access economy”). 
 93. See infra notes 101-103. 
 94. See infra notes 112-123. 
 95. See infra notes 133-143. 
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denominator.96
The need for and challenge of regulating the sharing economy are 
inextricably linked in that many of these risks relate to the way sharing 
entities blur the lines between public and private spaces and commercial 
and private transactions, requiring new regulation to ensure predictability, 
transparency, and coverage for liability.97 An additional challenge lies in 
developing regulations that are tailored to the unique demands of the new 
sharing structures, while not suppressing the benefits they offer. In this 
section, we explore the regulatory risks and challenges created by the new 
economy. These risks and responses, in turn, will help shape the new 
taxonomy of sharing companies we recommend in Part III. 
A. Tort Liability in Peer-to-Peer Transactions 
One set of regulatory challenges concerns the shift in some sharing 
companies away from traditional business models in which consumers 
purchase goods and services from centralized commercial entities and to 
models in which consumers work directly with individual service 
providers. In the new P2P model, Internet platforms facilitate these 
transactions, in many cases providing some initial level of curation.98
While the rules for tort liability may be relatively clear in traditional 
commercial transactions, the legal implications of activities may be much 
more difficult to parse when private individuals offer commercial goods 
and services or Internet platforms facilitate P2P transactions. Should an 
individual who occasionally accepts a passenger for gas money via Uber be 
required to hold the same liability coverage as a commercial taxi driver?99
Should homes listed on Airbnb be required to meet the same safety 
standards as hotels? Food service regulations may not recognize a 
designation for individuals who prepare a few meals a week in their home 
for a fee, as one might through TaskRabbit.100 Transportation regulations 
 96. See infra notes 145-150. 
 97. See, e.g., Morgan & Kuch, supra note 27, at 557–59 (discussing the “blurred line 
between gift and contract” in the sharing economy). 
 98. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. 
 99. In response to criticism and concern over a high-profile accident, Uber now 
provides liability insurance for drivers. It also requires them to pass certain background 
checks prior to driving for the company.  Vauhini Vara, Uber, Lyft, and Liability, THE NEW
YORKER (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/uber-lyft-liability 
[https://perma.cc/ZM33-75VQ]. 
 100. More than half of U.S. states currently have some form of “cottage food laws,” 
which allow home production of a small amount of non-hazardous food items. See Christina
Oatfield, Summary of Cottage Food Laws, SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES LAW CENTER,
http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/theselc/legacy_url/300/Summary-of-Cottage-Food-
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may be challenged to categorize drivers who accept a fee from riders a few 
days a week to offset the cost of gas. 
A related liability issue has arisen as to whether a platform is 
responsible for the acts of workers using its website, even if they are 
independent contractors. High-profile cases involving Uber drivers 
sexually assaulting, injuring, or even killing passengers and pedestrians 
have highlighted these concerns.101 Some have suggested that even if 
workers acting under the auspices of a platform are independent 
contractors, the platforms nonetheless should be held responsible under 
agency law for the workers’ actions.102 Of course, passengers are not the 
only ones who may be injured. Drivers are at risk as well, and some are 
demanding more protection from the companies that make money from the 
services they offer.103
Occasional sellers or those offering services may be unprepared for 
the potential tort liability that can arise from being a driver for hire, a chef, 
or even the host of a short-term rental.104 For example, are home cooks 
prepared for the liability that would follow if they served a meal tainted 
with E. coli?105 Would Airbnb hosts be prepared to cover damages if their 
Laws-in-the-US-31.pdf?1392426351 [https://perma.cc/HUW7-M6X7] (listing cottage food 
laws by state). 
 101. In February 2016, in one of the most chilling cases, an Uber driver went on a killing 
spree, targeting people at random in between picking up fares for the company. See Mark 
Guarino, William Wan & Missy Ryan, Uber Driver Who Killed Six in Kalamazoo Shooting 
Spree Chose Victims ‘At Random,’ Authorities Say, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/02/21/six-killed-in-kalamazoo-
shooting-spree-were-chosen-at-random-authorities-say [https://perma.cc/X74G-L95Z] 
(describing the murder committed by Uber driver Jason Brian Dalton). 
 102. See Mark Macmurdo, Hold the Phone!: “Peer-to-Peer” Ridesharing Services, 
Regulation, and Liability, 76 LA. L. REV. 307, 326–30 (2015) (arguing drivers’ apparent 
agency may lead to liability for ridesharing companies). 
 103. See Molly McHugh, Uber and Lyft Drivers Work Dangerous Jobs—But They’re on 
Their Own, WIRED (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.wired.com/2016/03/uber-lyft-can-much-
keep-drivers-safe [https://perma.cc/3JDJ-JZWL] (describing the dangers faced by drivers of 
ridesharing companies and the limited efforts made by Uber to increase safety for its 
drivers).
 104. See Loucks, supra note 31, at 331–38 (describing how individuals participating in 
transportation or housing sharing may be at risk for individual liability); Macmurdo, supra
note 102 (describing the potential liability drivers face); Brittany McNamara, Airbnb: A 
Not-So-Safe Resting Place, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 149 (2015) (noting that individual users of 
Airbnb may be subject to liability). 
 105. See Kate Williams, Food Startup Josephine Pauses East Bay Operations, NOSH 
(May 11, 2016), http://www.berkeleyside.com/2016/05/11/food-startup-josephine-pauses-
east-bay-operations [https://perma.cc/GET4-4ZHM] (reporting how cooks working for 
Josephine, a “company that connects enterprising home cooks with hungry neighbors via an 
online platform,” were “served with cease-and-desist orders for illegal food sales by 
environmental health regulators”). 
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overnight guests threw a massive party, sold alcohol to minors, or damaged 
nearby property?106
While consumers generally expect businesses to be regulated, those 
expectations may not align with the current legal requirements of new 
sharing economy ventures. Consumers, like providers, may therefore face 
some unpleasant surprises as a result of regulatory gaps in the new sharing 
economy. These surprises underscore the need for regulatory attention in 
this area. The buyers, renters, or consumers of a P2P transaction may not 
anticipate that these transactions can be riskier or more dangerous than a 
traditional commercial transaction. An Airbnb guest may expect that the 
home they rent through Airbnb will have an adequate electrical panel to 
prevent a house fire and smoke alarms if a fire does occur. A customer of a 
meal preparation service may expect the cook to adhere to food safety 
standards utilized in commercial kitchens. 
A striking example of the tension between consumer expectations and 
regulation of providers took place recently in Austin, Texas.107 Rideshare 
customers in Austin wanted drivers for services like Uber and Lyft to 
undergo basic background checks, while platform operators Uber and Lyft 
did not want their drivers to be required to undergo fingerprinting before 
offering rides.108 After a messy and contentious battle over a ballot measure 
“paid for and pushed by Uber and Lyft” as to whether or not to require a 
fingerprint background check for rideshare drivers, Uber and Lyft lost and 
as a result now refuse to serve Austin.109
Concerns for liability in small commercial transactions are not new or 
unique to the sharing economy. Individuals have undoubtedly always sold 
 106. See Alan Yuhas, Airbnb Hosts Return to Find Home Trashed After “Drug-Induced 
Orgy”, GUARDIAN (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/apr/30/ 
airbnb-calgary-home-trashed-drug-induced-orgy [https://perma.cc/EQ32-DXQ8] (describing 
a massive party at an Airbnb rental that resulted in $50,000 to $75,000 in damage to the 
home, as well as physical altercations, multiple noise complaints, and repeated calls to 
police).
 107. Kevin Ready, Uber vs. Austin—A Public Battle to Control the Future of 
Transportation, FORBES (May 12, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kevinready/ 
2016/05/12/uber-vs-austin-a-public-battle-to-control-the-future-of-
transportation/#6296c6d16243 [https://perma.cc/73QW-VTL2] (describing “a May 8th 
[2016] ballot initiative in which the voting public soundly rejected Uber and Lyft’s demands 
for city hall to remain ‘hands off’ and allow them to operate with less oversight”). 
 108. See id. (“The official issue on the ballot was whether or not to require a fingerprint 
background check for ride-share drivers . . . Uber and Lyft fought hard and lost.”). 
 109. See id. (noting suspension of service by Uber and Lyft in Austin); see also Jared
Meyer, By Losing Uber, Austin Is No Longer a Tech Capital, FORBES (May 11, 2016), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jaredmeyer/2016/05/11/by-losing-uber-austin-is-no-longer-a-
tech-capital/#50eb9f7249ab [https://perma.cc/3NVS-TKLZ] (noting the number of days that 
passed since Uber and Lyft have left Austin). 
39083 ple_19-3 S
heet N
o. 33 S
ide B
      05/11/2017   10:58:06
39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 33 Side B      05/11/2017   10:58:06
C M
Y K
2_SCOTT_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/17 5:32 PM
576 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 19:3 
small amounts of handmade food items and occasionally rented rooms in 
their homes, and the buyer and seller likely had little appreciation for the 
legal risks of those practices. The difference now is the scale and ease with 
which these transactions take place. As the notion of platform capitalism 
suggests, anyone can become a TaskRabbit “tasker” and offer to make a 
few meals a week for neighbors, or become an Uber driver.110 Anyone with 
an overflowing closet can sell his or her unwanted clothes on thredUP or 
offload their goods on Craigslist.111 As the scale of these enterprises grow, 
the need to ensure safety for those involved in these transactions also 
increases.
B. Independent Contractors and Platform Liability 
The difficulty in categorizing the blurred nature of the transactions in 
the P2P context extends to the characterization of the enterprise operating
the platforms through which goods and services are offered. Large platform 
entities, including Uber and Airbnb, take pains to emphasize that they do 
not provide services—they merely facilitate transactions between private 
parties.112  However, as they grow in scale and in financial resources, many 
 110. See Biz Carson, Why There’s a Good Chance Your Uber Driver is New, BUS.
INSIDER (Oct. 24, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-doubles-its-drivers-in-2015-
2015-10 [https://perma.cc/FU3V-UFNB] (“In 2015, Uber doubled the number of active 
drivers on its platform in the U.S. as it’s grown.”); Emily Badger, Now We Know How Many 
Drivers Uber Has—And Have a Better Idea of What They’re Making, WASH. POST:
WONKBLOG (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/01/20/ 
now-we-know-how-many-drivers-uber-has-and-have-a-better-idea-of-what-theyre-
making/?utm_term=.e7e507902aa5 [https://perma.cc/R65M-LVAC] (describing “the 
breakneck pace at which drivers are joining [Uber’s] ranks” and reporting that, as of 
December 2014, Uber had over 160,000 drivers and “[t]he number of new drivers signing 
up has doubled every six months for the past two years”). 
 111. Sarah Halzack, ThredUp: Reinventing the Resale Business 20 Years After eBay,
WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/ 
2015/09/21/thredup-reinventing-the-resale-business-20-years-after-ebay 
[https://perma.cc/78KK-WAED] (“ThredUp received 3.8 million items from sellers last year 
and $81 million in fresh funding earlier this month.”); Ruth Reader, thredUP Raises $81M 
to Help More People Sell Their Old Clothes, VENTUREBEAT (Sept. 10, 2015), 
http://venturebeat.com/2015/09/10/thredup-raises-81m-to-help-more-people-sell-their-old-
clothes [https://perma.cc/X4BB-DWFL] (“The company said it had 1.8 million visitors to its 
site in August 2015 (more than double the number that visited during the same time last 
year) and has 4 million registered users.”). 
 112. Uber’s policies, for example, require users to agree to the following disclosure: 
“YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT YOUR ABILITY TO OBTAIN TRANSPORTATION, 
LOGISTICS AND/OR DELIVERY SERVICES THROUGH THE USE OF THE 
SERVICES DOES NOT ESTABLISH UBER AS A PROVIDER OF 
TRANSPORTATION, LOGISTICS OR DELIVERY SERVICES OR AS A 
TRANSPORTATION CARRIER.” Legal, UBER, https://www.uber.com/legal/usa/terms 
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are calling for these businesses, and others that might be similarly situated, 
to accept responsibility for the transactions they are facilitating.113
Platform sites that offer users an opportunity to earn income (like 
Uber or TaskRabbit) typically categorize service providers as independent 
contractors.114 With so many workers using sharing platforms as a 
significant, or even sole, method of livelihood, this practice has raised 
significant concerns.115 Independent contractors generally lack protection 
under basic employment laws and do not have access to benefits or basic 
labor protections, including minimum wages and health care.116 The growth 
of this class of under-protected workers as a result of the sharing economy 
(in this context often referred to as the “gig-economy”)117 has received 
[https://perma.cc/SU7C-ANTZ] (last visited July 19, 2016); see also Terms of Service,
AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/terms [https://perma.cc/TD3A-EFWB] (last visited July 
19, 2016) (explaining “Airbnb makes available an online platform or marketplace with 
related technology for Guests and Hosts to meet online and arrange for bookings of 
Accommodations directly with each other. Airbnb is not an owner or operator of properties 
False Airbnb’s responsibilities are limited to: (i) facilitating the availability of the Site, 
Application and Services” and (ii) serving as the limited payment collection agent of each 
Host for the purpose of accepting payments from Guests on behalf of the Host.). 
 113. See infra notes 128-132 and accompanying text. 
 114. See Am I a TaskRabbit Employee?, TASKRABBIT, https://support.taskrabbit.com/hc/ 
en-us/articles/207555983-Am-I-a-TaskRabbit-employee- [https://perma.cc/LLV7-9DYS] 
(last visited July 19, 2016) (“Taskers on the platform are not employees of TaskRabbit; 
rather, they are independent contractors.”); see also McHugh, supra note 103 (“Because 
[Uber] drivers operate as independent contractors instead of employees, the companies can’t 
offer true safety training. Under federal law, training is a signifier that someone is an 
employee, and both Uber and Lyft have fought bitterly against re-classifying drivers as 
employees.”).
 115. See infra notes 166-167 and accompanying text. 
 116. See Ellen Huet, What Really Killed Homejoy? It Couldn’t Hold on to Its Customers,
FORBES (July 23, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/07/23/ what-really-
killed-homejoy-it-couldnt-hold-onto-its-customers/ [https://perma.cc/3FA2-9BWK] 
(explaining that a key flaw in the Homejoy business model was a failure to ensure quality 
service due to a lack of training for its workers); Scheiber, supra note 8 (arguing that 
electronic platforms “make it frighteningly easy for companies to outsource work” to low-
paid, independent contractors, and that this trend is likely to grow); DePillis, supra note 13 
(describing how Homejoy workers struggle to make a living by cleaning homes).  
Interestingly, Homejoy, which featured prominently in DePillis’s article, closed down in 
July 2015 due, at least in part, to lawsuits over the question of whether it had inappropriately 
classified its workers as independent contractors. 
 117. Sara Horowitz, The Freelance Surge Is the Industrial Revolution of Our Time, THE
ATLANTIC (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/09/the-
freelance-surge-is-the-industrial-revolution-of-our-time/244229 [https://perma.cc/55ER-
K6C7]; Arun Sundararajan, The “Gig Economy” Is Coming. What Will it Mean for Work?,
GUARDIAN (July 25, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/26/will-
we-get-by-gig-economy [https://perma.cc/WN3C-6AQM] (discussing how proponents of 
the gig economy argue that it creates flexible work that allows individuals to avoid the 
dreary office environment). 
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widespread criticism.118
The concern related to the use of independent contractors is two-fold. 
On one level, regulators must consider carefully whether Uber, TaskRabbit, 
and other platforms are properly applying the relevant legal classifications 
when determining that their workers are independent contractors. On a 
broader, societal level, regulators and legislators must determine if the 
existing classification scheme and the definition of independent contractors 
are robust enough to account for sharing economy workers and the 
increasing trend toward the use of non-employees in the commercial 
sphere.119
Perhaps in an attempt to head off such criticism and to meet 
expectations from customers and workers alike, some platforms have 
offered a number of new benefits, including insurance for drivers, workers, 
and customers,120 technical support to ensure taxes are paid by housing 
hosts,121 and minimum wage requirements for workers.122 However, on the 
central issue of whether workers for sites like TaskRabbit and Uber are 
 118. See infra notes 166-167 and accompanying text. 
 119. See Vanessa Katz, Regulating the Sharing Economy, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1067, 
1103–04 (2015) (“Whether platforms are truly neutral intermediaries is not always clear. In 
some cases, platforms have no formal contractual relationship with providersFalse In other 
cases, platforms hire providers as independent contractors, and therefore are not liable for a 
contractor’s torts. . . . Commentators have questioned whether sharing platforms misclassify 
employees as independent contractors.”). 
 120. See Ellen Huet, New Laws Push Uber and Lyft to Bump Up Insurance Coverage, 
But a Collision Gap Remains, FORBES (July 1, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/ellenhuet/2015/07/01/new-laws-push-uber-and-lyft-to-bump-up-insurance-coverage-
but-a-collision-gap-remains/#1856b03e107c [https://perma.cc/39P5-Z7E4] [hereinafter 
Huet, New Laws Push Uber] (“In response to new laws going into effect in 19 states . . . , 
Uber and Lyft both recently bumped up their liability insurance coverage to primary—
meaning it steps in first, before other policies—for that on-duty-but-unmatched period, a no-
man’s-land they had resisted covering for years.”); Adrienne Raphel, TaskRabbit Redux,
NEW YORKER (July 22, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/taskrabbit-
redux [https://perma.cc/33WZ-A7YB] (describing TaskRabbit’s addition of “an insurance 
policy, guaranteeing a million dollars of coverage for each task”). 
 121. Roberta A. Kaplan & Michael L. Nadler, Airbnb: A Case Study in Occupancy 
Regulation and Taxation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 103, 109, 113–14 (2015), available
at https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/page/airbnb-case-study-occupancy-regulation-and-
taxation [https://perma.cc/QDH6-6QNC] (describing Airbnb’s cooperation with New York 
State Attorney General’s subpoena for information about “illegal hoteliers” and pointing out 
that Airbnb “provides guidance regarding responsible hosting and, for certain key cities, 
directs hosts to relevant laws and regulations”). 
 122. See Raphel, supra note 120 (“The [TaskRabbit] model has built-in protections for 
workers. In the old auction model, a TaskRabbit could set a price with no bottom limit; now 
Taskers set hourly rates . . . , and a Tasker’s rate can never be lower than the highest 
minimum wage in the cities in which TaskRabbit is active.”). 
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independent contractors, platforms have not budged.123
C. Discrimination by Service Providers 
Growing evidence suggests that sharing economy service providers 
may discriminate against consumers based on their race, ethnicity, sex, or 
sexual orientation.124 While such discrimination is generally barred under 
workplace employment statutes,125 these laws may not apply to independent 
contractors.126 Thus, if a limousine driver refused to provide service to a 
black passenger, the passenger could successfully allege that the limousine 
company violated the laws against discrimination in public 
accommodations because the driver is an employee, and therefore an agent 
of that limousine company. By contrast, a black passenger snubbed by an 
Uber driver would not succeed on the same allegation if the driver is 
considered an independent contractor rather than an Uber employee.127
Consumers have accused Airbnb of racial discrimination, alleging that 
individual hosts have refused to accept requests from minorities.128 In May 
 123. See McHugh, supra note 103 (“[B]oth Uber and Lyft have fought bitterly against 
re-classifying drivers as employees.”). 
 124. See infra notes 128-132 and accompanying text. 
 125. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (“It shall be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”). 
 126. See, e.g., Adcock v. Chrysler Corp., 166 F.3d 1290, 1292 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Title VII 
provides, in pertinent part, that ‘[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.’ . . . Title VII protects employees, but does not 
protect independent contractors.” (citations omitted)). 
 127. Uber drivers have been shown to be less likely to stop in predominantly black 
neighborhoods of Washington, D.C., than in predominantly white neighborhoods, although 
taxi drivers may be no less discriminatory in their practices. See Jennifer Stark & Nicholas 
Diakopoulos, Uber Seems To Offer Better Service In Areas With More White People. That 
Raises Some Tough Questions, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Mar. 10, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/03/10/uber-seems-to-offer-better-
service-in-areas-with-more-white-people-that-raises-some-tough-questions
[https://perma.cc/F53K-YMT4] (discussing race-related differences in Uber services); see
also Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 95–98 
(2015), available at https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/page/social-costs-uber 
[https://perma.cc/R328-C8BA] (“Passengers may give bad reviews to racial-minority 
drivers, whether out of implicit or explicit bias. Drivers in turn may be less likely to pick up 
riders if they learn that they are racial minorities and may generally prefer to pick up or drop 
off clients in wealthier, whiter neighborhoods.”). 
 128. See Rachel Paula Abrahamson, Airbnb Host Rejects Black Woman Who Tried to 
Book a Room, Sends Hateful Messages, US WEEKLY (June 6, 2016), 
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2016, for example, an African-American man filed a class action lawsuit 
against the company after a host refused his request for accommodations 
under his own profile, which included a photo, but accepted his request 
when he used a fake profile with a photo of a white man.129 In addition, a 
recent Harvard Business School study found that Airbnb hosts were less 
likely to rent to customers with stereotypically black-sounding names than 
those with typical white names.130 As the study’s authors point out, the 
Internet platform of Airbnb may facilitate discrimination because it reveals 
more information about the putative guests’ race in advance of the 
transaction than traditional hotel reservation systems.131 The authors say 
http://www.usmagazine.com/celebrity-news/news/racist-airbnb-host-cancels-black-womans-
reservation-w208934 [https://perma.cc/L2S4-JWSJ] (recounting discriminatory messages 
received by Airbnb guest); Kenya Downs, Airbnb Enlists Eric Holder to Address Racial 
Discrimination, PBS NEWSHOUR (July 22, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/ 
rundown/complaints-racial-discrimination-airbnb-hires-eric-holder [https://perma.cc/6QE5-
PXH7] (describing “criticism over Airbnb’s approach to allegations of racial 
discrimination”); Taryn Finley, AirBnB Host Gets (Rightfully) Banned For Racist Messages,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 2, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/airbnb-banned-
racist-messages_us_57504534e4b0c3752dcc9f24 [https://perma.cc/27TV-WMVY]; Caitlin 
Huston, Airbnb Hosts Discriminate Against Black People, Study Finds, MARKETWATCH
(Dec. 11, 2015), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/airbnb-hosts-discriminate-against-
black-people-study-finds-2015-12-10 [https://perma.cc/JB7B-QAJ6]; Shankar Vedantam, 
#AirbnbWhileBlack: How Hidden Bias Shapes the Sharing Economy, NPR: HIDDEN BRAIN
(Apr. 26, 2016 12:10 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/04/26/475623339/-airbnbwhileblack-
how-hidden-bias-shapes-the-sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/22ST-S8S9].  Interestingly, 
in response to such allegations, several Airbnb-type services, including Innclusive and 
Noirbnb, have been established by racial minorities for racial minorities.  See Gaby Bissett, 
Two Rival Websites Launch as Airbnb Alternatives for Black People after Guests 
Experience Racial Discrimination When Trying to Book Accommodation, DAILY MAIL (June 
10, 2016), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3634803/Two-rival-websites-launch-
Airbnb-alternatives-black-people-guests-experience-racial-discrimination-trying-book-
accommodation.html [https://perma.cc/7JPV-TJ6R] (“. . . new websites have been set up as 
an alternative to Airbnb by people who feel the billion-dollar company does not do enough 
to combat discrimination.”); Taryn Finley, These Airbnb Alternatives Want to Make Travel 
More Welcoming for Black People, HUFFINGTON POST (June 21, 2016), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/innclusive-noirbnb-airbnb-alternatives_us_
5768462ae4b0853f8bf1c675 [https://perma.cc/K8YB-76XS]; Ijeoma Oluo, An Airbnb 
Service for Black People? I Wish it Weren’t Necessary, GUARDIAN (June 8, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/08/airbnb-service-black-people-
noirbnb-noirebnb [https://perma.cc/3KB9-GBFE]. 
 129. Hope King, Airbnb Sued for Discrimination, CNN: MONEY (May 18, 2016 4:56 
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/18/technology/airbnb-lawsuit-discrimination.  
[https://perma.cc/EDT8-Y38A]. 
 130. BENJAMIN EDELMAN, MICHAEL LUCA & DAN SVIRSKY, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN 
THE SHARING ECONOMY: EVIDENCE FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT (2016), available at
http://www.benedelman.org/publications/airbnb-guest-discrimination-2016-01-06.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R7BY-WPAG]. 
 131. Id. at 19. 
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that their study “contribute[s] to a small but growing body of literature 
suggesting that discrimination persists—and we argue may even be 
exacerbated—in online platforms.”132 Airbnb’s potential liability for 
discrimination in public accommodation, at both the state and federal 
levels, underscores the need for greater regulatory attention to this aspect of 
the sharing economy. 
D. Zoning Impact of Shared Space and On-Demand Services 
Consider next the way in which the sharing economy’s blurring of the 
lines between private and commercial spaces undermines zoning 
strategies.133 Airbnb creates commercial housing options in residential 
neighborhoods, where public services, including parking and roads, are 
designed to handle only the needs of a limited number of residents.134
Care.com and other websites facilitating transactions for individual service 
providers similarly facilitate the decentralization of commercial activities 
out of the nursing home, daycare center, restaurant, or hospital, and into 
private homes. While there may be benefits to this practice for both parties 
in these types of transactions, they nonetheless can strain infrastructure that 
was designed for different types of uses. 
Perhaps the best illustration of this problem is shown by the growth of 
Airbnb, an international powerhouse valued at $25 billion.135 While it 
started as a way for individuals to rent out unused guest rooms and make a 
little extra money on the side, it has become an increasingly commercial 
 132. Id. at 12. 
 133. See Jamila Jefferson-Jones, Airbnb and the Housing Segment of the Modern 
“Sharing Economy”: Are Short-Term Rental Restrictions an Unconstitutional Taking?, 42 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 557, 561–62 (2015) (noting that housing exchanges straddle a line 
between commercial and private transactions); SHAREABLE, supra note 37, at 6 (“The 
sharing economy challenges core assumptions made in 20th century planning and regulatory 
frameworks—namely, that residential, commercial, industrial, and agricultural activities 
should be physically separated from one [an]other . . . .”); see also Jenny Kassan & Janelle 
Orsi, The Legal Landscape of the Sharing Economy, 27 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1 (2012) 
(noting the difficulty in characterizing many activities within the sharing economy as solely 
personal or commercial); Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 27, at 15–16 (discussing how 
short term rental platforms violate zoning ordinances in many states). 
 134. See Rauch and Schleicher, supra note 82, at 920–22 (discussing conflicts over “use 
intensiveness” with various sharing entities, particularly in the shared housing arena). 
 135. Uptin Saiidi, As NYC Rents Rise, Some Ask if Airbnb Is to Blame, CNBC (Dec. 30, 
2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/30/nyc-rents-rise-airbnb-to-blame.html 
[https://perma.cc/H766-VXTA]; Mark Oswald, Report: City Missing Out on Airbnb Taxes 
as Web Bookings Soar, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Dec. 18, 2015), 
http://www.abqjournal.com/692998/north/report-city-missing-out-on-airbnb-taxes-as-web-
bookings-soar.html [https://perma.cc/HY4Z-PNAB]. 
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enterprise with entire homes dedicated to short-term rentals.136 Some 
neighborhoods in San Francisco, New York, and Los Angeles are fighting 
to maintain community cohesion under pressure from large numbers of 
short-term rentals,137 hotels are complaining that Airbnb has an unfair 
advantage because its listings are not required to meet the same commercial 
standards,138 and municipalities are looking at millions of dollars in lost 
revenue from unpaid taxes.139
While Airbnb has sought to maintain positive relationships with the 
jurisdictions in which it operates,140 it has nonetheless been linked to a 
 136. JOHN W. O’NEILL & YUXIA OUYANG, AM. HOTEL & LODGING ASS’N, FROM AIR
MATTRESSES TO UNREGULATED BUSINESS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE OTHER SIDE OF AIRBNB 3 
(2016), available at https://fortunedotcom.files.wordpress.com/2016/01/ 
pennstate_airbnbreport_.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KB2-DAKP] (finding that 30% of Airbnb’s 
total revenue from twelve cities, amounting to $378 million, was derived from “full-time 
operators”); Carolyn Said, The Airbnb Effect, S.F. CHRON. (July 12, 2015), 
http://www.sfchronicle.com/airbnb-impact-san-francisco-2015/#1 [https://perma.cc/8UHW-
MVJK] [hereinafter Said, The Airbnb Effect].
 137. Emily Alpert Reyes, L.A. Officials Want to Keep Airbnb-Type Rentals from Being 
‘Rogue Hotels, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-
airbnb-rental-regulations-20150825-story.html [https://perma.cc/3ZPY-KZ2S]; Jay Cassano, 
What the Data Says About Airbnb in New York City, FAST COMPANY (visited Mar. 2, 2015), 
http://www.fastcoexist.com/3042719/what-the-data-says-about-airbnb-in-new-york-city
[https://perma.cc/Z6UR-YRCY]; Carolyn Said, Window into Airbnb’s Hidden Impact on 
S.F., S.F. CHRON. (June 2014) [hereinafter Said, Window],
http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/item/Window-into-Airbnb-s-hidden-impact-on-S-F-
30110.php [https://perma.cc/4HSF-BNGL]. 
 138. See O’NEILL & OUYANG, supra note 136, at 2 (“A growing number of hosts are 
using the Airbnb platform to operate an unregulated, full-time business.”); see also Adam 
Thomson, Airbnb Hit by Unfair Competition Complaint from French Hotels, FIN. TIMES
(June 23, 2016), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6ff2b192-3951-11e6-9a05-82a9b15a8ee7. 
html#axzz4FN6FXE6l [https://perma.cc/EX2B-CD5U] (“A leading French hoteliers’ 
association has lodged a formal complaint against Airbnb and other online accommodation-
rental services, arguing that they compete unfairly in the country.”). 
 139. See, e.g., Chabeli Herrera, Airbnb and Hoteliers Battle Over Role, Regulations for 
Home-Sharing in Miami, MIAMI HERALD (May 25, 2016), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/tourism-cruises/article79673612.html 
[https://perma.cc/8SQL-JAX3] (“Hoteliers argue Airbnb has gone unregulated too long, 
allowing it to circumvent the rules and taxes enforced on traditional lodging 
accommodations . . .”); Tom Bergeron, The Money Municipalities Don’t Know They Have 
Coming: How Airbnb Could Impact the New Jersey Economy, NJBIZ (Feb. 8, 2016), 
http://www.njbiz.com/article/20160208/NJBIZ01/160209806/the-money-municipalities-
dont-know-they-have-coming-how-airbnb-could-impact-the-new-jersey-economy
[https://perma.cc/FSW7-S7MZ]; Oswald, supra note 135. 
 140. Carolyn Said, Airbnb Will Pay Taxes, Play Nice With Cities—On Its Terms, S.F.
CHRON. (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Airbnb-will-pay-
taxes-play-nice-with-cities-6626099.php [https://perma.cc/84PH-5REY] [hereinafter Said, 
Airbnb) (reporting that Airbnb “would play ball with civic leaders worldwide in several 
ways: by collecting hotel taxes, sharing anonymized information about local short-term 
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variety of negative consequences for the neighborhoods and areas it serves, 
from an undue burden on public services without compensation, to rising 
rents, to a loss of community and neighborhood cohesion.141 Residents in 
popular Airbnb neighborhoods may find parking limited and roads 
crowded.142 For this reason, cities have responded to Airbnb in differing 
ways, some seeking to ban it altogether, and others trying to limit its 
spread.143 Cities may have to devise new regulatory systems to address 
more than simply the short-term threat of Airbnb and to account for the 
new, blended public-private spaces favored by the sharing economy. 
E. Sharewashing: Gauging the Truth of Social Mission Claims 
Another risk of sharing economy ventures is that consumers can be 
misled as to the social or environmental benefits of so-called “sharing” 
enterprises. While the early proponents of the sharing economy emphasized 
the social good of reducing consumption and strengthening communities, 
many companies in today’s sharing economy are far from socially 
beneficial.144 These companies may unfairly profit from a lingering false 
positive association with prototypical sharing ventures, misleading 
consumers in the process, or may deliberately use the positive associations 
of the sharing economy to shift risks to workers and reduce liability.145
rentals, and by asking hosts in cities where housing is scarce to verify that they are renting 
their permanent residence.”). 
 141. See Oswald, supra note 135 (citing report concluding Santa Fe is missing out on up 
to $2.1 million in lodging taxes from short-term rentals). 
 142. See Said, Window, supra note 137; Said, The Airbnb Effect, supra note 136. 
 143. See Marie Mawad, Helene Fouquet & Henry Goldman, City Mayors Worldwide 
Forge Alliance in Response to Airbnb, Uber, BLOOMBERG: TECH. (June 20, 2016), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-20/city-mayors-worldwide-forge-
alliance-in-response-to-airbnb-uber [https://perma.cc/A83N-KGY9] (noting how cities are 
banding together to promote clearer ground rules for companies like Airbnb and Ubeer); 
Brad Tuttle, 7 Cities Where the Sharing Economy Is Freshly Under Attack, MONEY (June 9, 
2014), http://time.com/money/2800742/uber-lyft-airbnb-sharing-economy-city-regulation
[https://perma.cc/85ZB-DAZ7]. 
 144. See supra notes 146-150 and accompanying text. 
 145. Some have suggested that on-demand service providers may portray themselves as 
part of the sharing economy to avoid traditional dispute resolution processes.  See Kulp & 
Kool, supra note 69, at 195 (“For instance, in framing itself as a sharing economy business 
that merely provides an online platform for car owners to use their existing possessions to 
earn revenue, Uber claims it . . . should not be encumbered by the city regulations False 
Similarly, . . . [the co-founder] of Airbnb, claims that the company simply wants to help 
people ‘share’ their homes with others and thus should not be subject to some of cities’ 
housing authority regulations.”); see also JULIET SCHOR, GREAT TRANSITION INITIATIVE,
DEBATING THE SHARING ECONOMY 8–10 (2014), available at
http://www.greattransition.org/images/GTI_publications/Schor_Debating_the_Sharing_Eco
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Uber presents a sobering example. Among other controversies, Uber 
has been accused of monopolistic behavior, threatening public officials and 
journalists, trying to run competitors out of business, not paying drivers 
adequately, and operating illegally.146 During peak times, Uber institutes 
“surge pricing,” in which it raises the cost of rides, reportedly as much as 
nine times the cost of off-peak rides.147 There can be no doubt that Uber has 
achieved significant market power and is not shy about using that power 
for commercial gain. 
The potential for consumers to be misled continues when one 
considers the promised benefits of the sharing economy. While early 
proponents of the sharing economy talked about maximizing the use of 
underutilized assets, platform enterprises may actually increase or 
encourage consumption. If Uber represents a way for individuals to earn an 
income from a vehicle, they may be more likely to own a car, while the 
easy availability of Uber transportation may also provide a disincentive for 
people to walk or ride a bus.148 Platforms that enable “sharing” of toys 
(ToysTrunk), clothes (Le Tote), and books (Booksfree) through monthly 
subscription services may represent an improvement on the problem of 
underutilized assets, or may simply encourage greater consumption of 
resources by making it cheaper and easier to get access to a continual flow 
nomy.pdf [https://perma.cc/RR82-6NR6] (discussing claims that platforms use the sharing 
economy moniker to exploit labor). 
 146. See Kulp & Kool, supra note 69, at 195–96; Mitchell, supra note 14, at 78–93 
(assessing variety of legal complaints against Uber); Posen, supra note 15, at 418 
(describing complaints about Uber from taxi drivers and operators, Uber riders, and Uber 
drivers).
 147. See Mitchell, supra note 14, at 80–82 (describing surge pricing); Nicholas 
Diakopoulos, How Uber Surge Pricing Really Works, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Apr. 17, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/04/17/how-uber-surge-
pricing-really-works/ [https://perma.cc/SHC7-Y77G] (analyzing data to determine if, as 
Uber claims, surge pricing works to get more drivers on the road). 
 148. See SCHOR, supra note 145, at 6 (citing study concluding that for the majority of 
users, carsharing provided greater access to cars); Michael Cabanatuan, S.F. Traffic: 
Numbers Don’t Show Why It Really Is Bad, S.F. GATE (May 16, 2015) 
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/S-F-traffic-Numbers-don-t-show-why-it-really-
6268436.php [https://perma.cc/F6M8-ZHAK] (noting that ridesharing services have 
increased traffic in San Francisco because “[t]he transportation revolution that brought ride 
services like Uber and Lyft has added thousands of vehicles to the streets—estimates range 
as high as 15,000”); Catherine Rampell, Who Will Win the Ridesharing War? Probably Not 
Consumers, WASH. POST OP. (Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ 
catherine-rampell-consumers-likely-to-lose-the-uber-lyft-ride-share-war/2014/10/02/ 
f4810f74-4a6c-11e4-a046-120a8a855cca_story.html [https://perma.cc/M54L-EBXR] (citing 
studies that conclude ridesharing services discourage more environmentally-friendly forms 
of transportation, including bicycling and walking). 
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of new goods.149
The fact that a company may reduce the private ownership of goods 
by using a rental or access model does not necessarily mean that it is 
reducing consumption. Indeed, the environmental impacts of transporting 
all of those rental boxes on a monthly basis may offset whatever benefits 
lie in reducing acquisition in the first place.150 These examples illustrate the 
difficulty consumers face in analyzing and verifying companies’ claims of 
having a social mission. 
F. Resistance to Regulation of the Sharing Economy 
A final, slightly different type of challenge to regulating the sharing 
economy is the pressure against regulation from industry champions. Some 
proponents of the sharing economy argue that it offers unique 
environmental, economic, and/or community-building benefits, and that 
sharing enterprises therefore deserve to be exempted from some 
regulations—or at least to have regulations adapted to their particular 
characteristics.151 Others argue that new sharing enterprises represent an 
important technological innovation and disruptive new business model.152
 149. See Steven Hill, Is the Sharing Economy Truly Green?, SIERRA (Mar. 14, 2016), 
http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/2016-2-march-april/green-life/sharing-economy-truly-green 
[https://perma.cc/W88Q-Q4XM] (“The ‘sharing’ platforms are creating new markets that 
appear to be expanding the volume of commerce.”); see also supra notes 74-77 and 
accompanying text. 
 150. Unfortunately, evidence regarding the total resource impact of subscription services 
versus traditional methods of consumption is primarily anecdotal.  See supra notes 148-149 
and accompanying text. 
 151. See SHAREABLE, supra note 37, at 4 (“Resource sharing, peer production, and the 
free market can empower people to self-provision locally much of what they need to thrive. 
Yet we’ve learned that current U.S. policies often block resource sharing and peer 
production False Even when legacy institutions are failing to serve, which is increasingly 
the case, citizens are not free to share with or produce for each other. New policies are 
needed to unlock the 21st Century power of cities as engines of freedom, innovation and 
shared prosperity.”); Lonnie Shekhtman, Is Sharing Illegal? In Many Cases, Yes, TRIPLE
PUNDIT (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.triplepundit.com/special/rise-of-the-sharing-
economy/regulating-sharing [https://perma.cc/8X8P-34GN] (suggesting that regulations 
may impede sharing economy businesses and unfairly protect incumbent businesses). 
 152. See Boyd Cohen & Jan Kietzmann, Ride On! Mobility Business Models for the 
Sharing Economy, 27 ORG. & ENV’T 279, 279–80 (2014) (suggesting the sharing economy 
creates potential for new economic models that should be further explored); Molly Cohen & 
Arun Sundararajan, Self-Regulation and Innovation in the Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 116, 116 (2015), https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/page/self-
regulation-and-innovation-peer-peer-sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/C2QW-2MSL] 
(noting traditional regulation may interfere with innovative new sharing economy and peer-
to-peer business models); Downes, supra note 18 (arguing that sharing economy businesses 
are disrupting “long-mature supply chains”). 
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These cycles of innovation and disruption, some argue, can be beneficial or 
even necessary for economic development.153 In this case, regulation could 
stifle innovation and disruption, cementing old ways of doing business and 
preventing industry growth and change that ultimately could be more 
beneficial to society. 
It bears noting that the sharing economy, as currently defined, relies 
heavily on reputation to build trust and enable P2P transactions.154 Many 
believe that this level of transparency and information sharing imposes a 
form of self-regulation that can substitute for government intervention.155
III. REDEFINING, CATEGORIZING, AND REGULATING THE NEW
SHARING ECONOMY
To address the risks and challenges identified in Part II, we propose a 
two-stage process: first, we offer a taxonomy of sharing that creates 
meaningful categories for regulation based on the types of risks identified 
above; and second, we offer regulatory recommendations targeted to each 
of the categories in the taxonomy. 
A. Taxonomy of Sharing 
The purpose of creating a taxonomy is to provide clarity in the 
definition of the sharing economy and create a system of categorization for 
the multitude of sharing economy business models that will facilitate 
 153. For a thorough discussion of innovation and the potential benefits of innovation, see 
Ranchordás, supra note 13, at 425–36; see also MARK KNICKREHM, BRUNO BERTHON &
PAUL DAUGHERTY, ACCENTURE STRATEGY, DIGITAL DISRUPTION: THE GROWTH MULTIPLIER
2 (2016), available at https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/PDF-4/Accenture-Strategy-
Digital-Disruption-Growth-Multiplier.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC5J-8XS6] (concluding that 
technology and digital disruption are necessary to unlock significant value in the world 
economy).
 154. See BÉNÉDICTE DAMBRINE, JOSEPH JEROME & BEN AMBROSE, USER REPUTATION:
BUILDING TRUST AND ADDRESSING PRIVACY ISSUES IN THE SHARING ECONOMY 2 (2015), 
available at https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/FPF_SharingEconomySurvey_06_08_15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CM79-ULTN] (“For a basic peer-to-peer exchange, a positive outcome 
can often be tied to each peer’s reputation; buyers and sellers have to be able to trust in the 
benefit of an exchange.”); Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 152, at 128–29; Jedidiah 
Bracy, In the Sharing Economy, Could Reputation Replace Regulation?, INT’L ASS’N
PRIVACY PROF’LS: PRIVACY ADVISOR (June 10, 2015), https://iapp.org/news/a/in-the-
sharing-economy-could-reputation-replace-regulation [https://perma.cc/KR87-STMP] 
(describing importance of reputation in sharing economy and discussing Federal Trade 
Commission proceedings on the question of whether new regulation is needed to protect 
consumers). 
 155. See Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 152, at 129–32 (proposing judicious use of 
self-regulation to monitor sharing economy businesses). 
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regulation. As described in Part I.B, popular understandings of the new 
sharing economy companies appear to have three common characteristics. 
First, they are based on an Internet-enabled platform that facilitates 
transactions for goods and services. Second, they operate in one of three 
areas, each of which has an identifying characteristic that distinguishes it 
from traditional commercial enterprises. Third, through an algorithm, 
platform curation, and/or user selection, they offer some form of individual 
or personalized transaction experience.  In this part, we use these common 
characteristics to create a taxonomy and model for defining and classifying 
sharing economy businesses. 
Figure 2 provides a schematic representation of the taxonomy: 
FIGURE 2
Under our taxonomy, the first step toward categorizing an entity as 
part of the new sharing economy is to identify an Internet platform that 
facilitates transactions.  This step eliminates from the taxonomy small-scale 
cooperatives, collectives, or community groups that rely primarily on a 
physical presence or in-person network.  While such groups or entities may 
engage in sharing, we would not categorize them as part of the new sharing 
economy because their rarity and relatively small reach give them minimal, 
if any, impact on the larger economy. 
The second step requires identifying the types of transactions that the 
entity engages in, each of which can be distinguished from traditional 
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commercial consumerism in a particular way.  We have identified three 
categories for our taxonomy: 
Reduced and/or redefined consumption of goods.  Entities in this 
category facilitate transactions for access over new product ownership,156
including renting, bartering, and selling used goods.157  Many of these 
entities allow consumers to gain access to goods that at one time were only 
available for outright ownership, such as surfboards or formal dresses.158
Some of the goods may be intangible, such as music and media, to which 
companies like Netflix and Spotify provide access.  These companies are 
distinguishable from traditional commercial enterprises by the redefined 
notion of consumption through reuse or access rather than ownership.  
Some of these enterprises operate on a P2P basis, but many do not. 
On-demand and short-term services.  Companies in this sector 
match short-term workers, generally independent contractors, with jobs 
ranging from driving to assembling IKEA furniture.  Many offer consumers 
the opportunity to outsource peripheral tasks, such as running errands 
(TaskRabbit), fixing the kitchen sink (Handy), or doing laundry (Washio). 
Importantly, these companies offer more flexible forms of employment to 
the errand runners, housecleaners, and handymen than traditional forms of 
employment, a development often referred to as the “gig economy.”159  A 
key aspect of this category that distinguishes it from traditional temporary 
employment is that all of the transactions involve some kind of P2P 
connection, either on a direct or curated basis.160  This category also 
includes platforms that facilitate access to individual makers and producers 
of goods.  For example, Etsy would fall into this category,161 as would 
 156. See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 1, at 881 (“[A]ccess-based consumption, defined 
as transactions that can be market mediated but where no transfer of ownership takes 
place. . .  The consumer is acquiring consumption time with the item, and, in market-
mediated cases of access, is willing to pay a price premium for use of that object.”).  Id. at 
883 (breaking access further into a variety of access systems, including memberships in 
clubs and organizations, redistribution markets, and collaborative lifestyles). 
 157. See Botsman, supra note 80 (calling such facilitation the reinvention of traditional 
market behaviors). 
 158. See Rent the Runway, supra note 45 (allowing consumers to rent formal dresses); 
SPINLISTER, https://www.spinlister.com [https://perma.cc/DE79-TN6W] (last visited July 21, 
2016) (renting bikes, surfboards, and snowboards to public). 
 159. Sundararajan, supra note 117. 
 160. Daiane Scaraboto, Selling, Sharing, and Everything in Between: The Hybrid 
Economies of Collaborative Networks, 42 J. CONSUMER RES. 152, 153 (2015) (describing 
collaborative platforms, like Etsy, as part of a hybrid economy “characterized by complex 
interactions between social and commercial interests”). 
 161. See, e.g., Botsman, supra note 80 (considering Etsy as part of the “collaborative 
economy,” which “unlocks the value of underused assets by matching needs and haves.”). 
But see Raz Godelnik, Is the Public Etsy Still Part of the Sharing Economy?, TRIPLE PUNDIT
(Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.triplepundit.com/2015/04/public-etsy-still-part-real-sharing-
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FarmersWeb, a platform that puts local food buyers in touch with small 
farmers.162
Shared space.  Some of the largest sharing economy companies 
operate in the areas of housing, commercial office space, and land use.  
Unlike traditional commercial entities, these sharing economy companies 
use their Internet platforms to facilitate access (not ownership) to 
underused privately-owned spaces.  They may also provide access to 
shared commercial spaces. Category 3 includes Airbnb, WeWork, and 
Shared Earth (a non-profit platform that facilitates connections between 
people who have land they are willing to share with gardeners, and 
gardeners looking for land).  These entities may operate on a P2P or non-
P2P basis. 
This second level of categorization also screens out some businesses.  
The platform eBay provides is an instructive example. eBay began as a 
sharing enterprise that enabled P2P transactions through an online auction 
model, primarily for used or resale goods, and was therefore very much a 
Category 1 enterprise.  Today, however, eBay has moved away from 
redefined consumption to focus on the sale of new goods by commercial 
sellers.  As its 2015 Annual Report states: 
While eBay was once an auction site selling vintage items, today 
80% of the items sold on eBay are new. . . To deliver a more 
robust commerce platform, in 2015 we embarked on a 
significant, long-term effort to evolve our core eBay marketplace, 
moving away from a listings-based format toward a product-
based format.163
Based on this shift in eBay’s business model, we would no longer 
include it in the sharing economy.  Although it continues to offer some P2P 
transactions for used goods, the site focuses on increasing sales and 
commercial transactions in a product-first marketplace.  In other words, it 
now focuses on a traditional notion of consumption and therefore does not 
economy [https://perma.cc/L4CS-3432] (positing that whether Etsy should be considered 
part of the new sharing economy at all is a matter of debate. Some have expressed concern 
that Etsy, now a publicly-traded company, no longer shares the values of collaborative 
consumption that made it part of the original sharing economy); see also Grace Dobush, 
How Etsy Alienated Its Crafters and Lost Its Soul, WIRED (Feb. 19, 2015), 
http://www.wired.com/2015/02/etsy-not-good-for-crafters [https://perma.cc/68JS-GPVK] 
(stating that we include Etsy in our taxonomy because it facilitates consumers’ interactions 
with artisans and other makers, while acknowledging that Etsy permits mass manufacturers 
to sell on its site as well, to many artisans’ dismay). 
 162. FARMERSWEB, supra note 59. 
 163. EBAY, Annual Report, 6 (2015), available at http://files.shareholder.com/ 
downloads/ebay/2049302125x0x882672/742AC716-B4DB-40F8-83B0-
793F0D6BDA5C/EBAY_2015_Annual_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/LA65-Z7BJ]. 
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fall within the taxonomy. 
The third unique characteristic of sharing economy companies is the 
way the platform creates an individualized or personalized connection to 
the transaction.  In the early days of the sharing economy, this occurred 
primarily through P2P transactions in which the user purchased goods or 
services directly from providers.164  While we do not believe that entities 
must use a P2P model to be part of the sharing economy, we note that 
many of the entities that no longer use this model still provide an 
individualized service experience, either by curating transactions between 
sellers and buyers or by using user preferences to select a particular service 
provider from a group of independent contractors. 
Following from this consideration of individualized transactions and 
the P2P nature of many sharing economy companies, the third step of our 
taxonomy categorizes entities based on whether or not they operate on a 
P2P basis.  This is important because many of the risks identified in Part II 
are based on the P2P service model.  Accordingly, this level of the 
taxonomy facilitates regulatory recommendations.  Within the on-demand 
services category, all transactions are offered on a P2P basis, but the 
platform provides varying levels of curation.  In Part III.B, we tie our 
regulatory recommendations to the level of curation provided by these 
businesses.
B. Regulatory Recommendations 
As the sharing economy has grown and new, more significant risks 
have surfaced, many have called for increased regulation.  Proposals for 
regulation often focus on the sector in which the entity operates (i.e., 
transportation).165  In this section, we offer regulatory recommendations 
that follow from the taxonomy described above, rather than the sector that 
the entity serves.  This approach more closely links regulatory 
recommendations to regulatory risks and therefore can be more narrowly 
tailored to addressing those risks, without stifling economic or social 
benefits. 
1. Category 1 (Sharing Goods): Focus on Transparency 
Category 1 of the taxonomy includes sharing economy companies that 
 164. See Loucks, supra note 31; Rassman, supra note 15; Posen, supra note 15, at 407. 
 165. See generally Shuford, supra note 7 (discussing regulating the shared 
accommodations sector of sharing economy); Rassman, supra note 15 (proposing 
regulations for ridesharing); SHAREABLE, supra note 37 (proposing regulations based on 
sharing sectors of transportation, food, and housing). 
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focus on redefined consumption of goods, either on a P2P or non-P2P 
basis.  Two central risks flow from these types of businesses.  First, 
consumers purchasing goods from a P2P business may not understand that 
they are not working with commercial entities and therefore should not 
have the same expectations for product safety, reliability, and adherence to 
regulations that they might in traditional commercial transactions.  Second, 
consumers may be misled as to the environmental benefits of the access 
model of ownership. 
Notably, the first concern does not apply to commercial platforms 
operating on a non-P2P basis, such as Zipcar or Pley.  These platform 
entities can and should be expected to comply with existing regulations for 
consumer products.  To narrowly address this risk, we suggest that 
regulations be targeted to entities utilizing the P2P model and that any new 
regulations focus on transparency and notification to consumers, rather 
than limiting options available in the marketplace. 
The second risk is addressed below in Part III.B.4 because it cuts 
across all three categories of the sharing economy taxonomy. 
2. Category 2 (On-Demand Services): Focus on P2P Services and 
Curation 
Within Category 2, a number of risks have emerged, all of which 
relate to the use of P2P or curated P2P services and the misclassification of, 
or reliance upon, independent contractors.  These risks include the lack of 
legal protection and benefits for workers, discrimination by independent 
contractors, and consumer expectations that contractors have undergone 
some level of screening for some level of safety qualification. 
In this category, new regulations may be necessary to protect workers 
and ensure that the platform enterprise is not used to avoid creating 
employer/employee relationships.  We propose first that states create 
enhanced transparency and reporting requirements for workers associated 
with P2P on-demand service platforms so that states can monitor “hot 
spots,” where certain platforms are becoming associated with negative 
labor practices.  Enterprises should be required to publicly disclose their 
requirements for association with the platform (i.e., arbitration agreements, 
covenants not to compete with other platforms, publicity agreements, etc.) 
and to provide annual reports to regulators that would include information 
such as the numbers of hours worked by any individuals for whom the 
platform was required to file a Federal 1099 form. 
By proactively starting with transparency, states will be in a position 
to monitor when workers of a given platform enterprise are committing the 
majority of their time to that enterprise, whether they are being asked to 
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agree to onerous conditions, and whether conditions suggest that an 
employer/employee relationship has been created.  This information may 
allow the state to further investigate whether workers are being 
misclassified based on either federal or state standards and whether the 
state should create special designations to avoid allowing the platform to 
take advantage of the independent contractor status. 
The misclassification of employees as independent contractors has 
long been a problem in many industries, including the construction industry 
and both the taxicab and transportation services industries.166  In some 
cases, legislation has been used to clarify the status of employees or to 
provide a presumption that employees in a certain industry are, in fact, 
employees.167 If reporting reveals hot spots with large numbers of 
potentially misclassified employees, new legislation along these lines may 
be required to protect workers. 
To protect and inform consumers, regulations should focus on the 
platform entity and the level of curation it provides.  For a platform like 
craigslist, which provides virtually no curation, consumers are unlikely to 
assume that workers have gone through any kind of screening or training.  
For these platforms, a “buyer beware” approach may be appropriate. 
However, when a platform provides significantly more curation—for 
example, when Handy.com chooses a service provider for customers—the 
platform must be expected to take on a significantly higher burden of 
liability.  Similarly, if the platform creates a reasonable expectation by 
customers that it is responsible for providing some level of safety or 
quality, it should not then be permitted to disavow liability for the acts of 
its contractors.168
Regulations aimed at protecting the safety of the public should be 
narrowly tailored to the risks of the enterprise.  In California, the Public 
Utilities Commission (CPUC) considered the risks attendant to ridesharing 
enterprises in 2013 and created a new designation—Transportation 
 166. See David Bauer, The Misclassification of Independent Contractors: The Fifty-Four 
Billion Dollar Problem, 12 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 138, 141–44, 171–72 (2015) 
(discussing why employers misclassify employees as independent contractors, including taxi 
cab drivers, for tax and employment purposes). 
 167. In Maryland, the Workplace Fraud Act of 2009 created a presumption that 
individuals in the construction or landscaping fields were employees, rather than 
independent contractors. Id. at 171 (citing MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 3-901–3-920 
(West 2012)). 
 168. Uber has denied liability for accidents caused by its drivers.  See, e.g., Family of Six 
Year Old Girl Killed By Uber Driver Settles Lawsuit, ABC7 NEWS (July 14, 2015), 
http://abc7news.com/business/family-of-6-year-old-girl-killed-by-uber-driver-settles-
lawsuit/852108/ [https://perma.cc/9B8S-U2H3] (noting Uber’s denial of liability in court 
proceedings).
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Network Company or TNC—that includes entities that use Internet 
applications to connect drivers with riders.169  In concluding that TNCs 
required regulation, the CPUC emphasized that its primary interest was to 
ensure public safety, which overrode any concerns about the rapidly 
evolving or nascent nature of the industry.170  The regulations governing 
TNCs are directly related to the risk of injury to the public: required 
background checks, driver training programs, drug and alcohol policies, 
and insurance coverage.171
Maker platforms that operate on a P2P basis raise the concern that 
novice providers of goods and services will fail to follow established 
regulatory requirements or will be unprepared for commercial liability.  
Etsy, the preeminent artisan platform, attempts to protect itself from 
liability for these risks by explicitly providing in its “House Rules” that 
individual sellers are solely responsible for any defects, damage, or other 
potential liability arising from their sales on the Etsy website.172  However, 
this notice does little to protect consumers.  Again, we argue that regulatory 
requirements should be guided by the level of curation of platforms and the 
attendant potential for confusion on the part of customers as to the 
commercial quality and safety of their goods.  Where the platform creates 
the reasonable expectation by consumers that their purchases are overseen 
by the platform, it must assume some liability for legal concerns that arise 
in platform-facilitated transactions.173  In addition, platforms should be 
 169. DECISION ADOPTING RULES AND REGULATIONS TO PROTECT PUBLIC SAFETY WHILE
ALLOWING NEW ENTRANTS TO THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY, Rulemaking 12-12-011, 
Decision 13-09-045, at 2 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Sept. 19, 2013), available at
http://www.taxi-library.org/cpuc-2013/cpuc-decision-sept-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6B3-
LY6J] [hereinafter Decision 12-12-011] (defining a Transportation Network Company “as 
an organization whether a corporation, partnership, sole proprietor, or other form, operating 
in California that provides prearranged transportation services for compensation using an 
online-enabled application (app) or platform to connect passengers with drivers using their 
personal vehicles”); id. at 2–3 n.3 (explaining that the TNC designation does not override 
existing exemptions for non-profit entities or for ridesharing that might be actual “sharing,” 
i.e., where the ridesharing is “incidental to another purpose of the driver”). 
 170. Id. at 3 (“[T]he Commission is aware that TNCs are a nascent industry. Innovation 
does not, however, alter the Commission’s obligation to protect public safety, especially 
where, as here, the core service being provided—passenger transportation on public 
roadways—has safety impacts for third parties and property.”). 
 171. Id. at 35–58. 
 172. Our House Rules: Terms of Use, ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/legal/terms-of-use
[https://perma.cc/NHU6-7ECC] (last visited July 20, 2016) (including provisions such as 
“[y]ou release Etsy from any claims related to items sold through our Services, including for 
defective items, misrepresentations by sellers or items that caused physical injury (like 
product liability claims)”).
 173. ETSY, supra note 57 (reassuring customers that “Etsy handles and protects every 
transaction, so shop with confidence.”). 
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required to provide basic information to their workers about liability 
insurance, taxes, and relevant health and safety regulations.174
3. Category 3 (Shared Spaces): Focus on Zoning 
With respect to Category 3 entities, we find that the primary risks 
relate to the blurred lines between public and private spaces and the way 
these blurred lines challenge traditional zoning provisions.  The nature of 
these entities suggests that rigid rules barring or allowing sharing 
enterprises risk either blocking innovative business models or failing to 
address reasonable risks to communities and municipalities.  Instead, 
regulations focused on zoning should take a moderate approach, allowing 
communities to benefit from the innovative business models offered by 
these sharing enterprises, while still protecting communities and 
municipalities from harm. 
A number of cities struggling with the challenges posed by Airbnb are 
taking this approach by limiting the number of days a unit can be rented on 
Airbnb and/or by requiring the host to live in the unit for a significant 
portion of the year.175  In Amsterdam, regulators have also taken this path, 
allowing for limited private home rentals rather than barring the practice 
completely.176  The New York State Legislature, however, recently passed a 
bill prohibiting the rental of entire apartments for fewer than thirty days in 
New York City if the residents are not present.177
In the zoning context, the scale of the enterprise should also be 
considered in drafting new regulations, as it is the scale of the enterprise 
 174. See How Do Taxes Work for Hosts?, AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/481/how-do-taxes-work-for-hosts 
[https://perma.cc/9LGB-HV4M] (last visited July 20, 2016) [hereinafter How Do Taxes 
Work] (outlining how taxes work for host properties). 
 175. Heather Kelly, Why Everyone Is Cracking Down on Airbnb, CNN: MONEY (June 
23, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/22/technology/airbnb-regulations 
[https://perma.cc/7PVF-KVTN]. 
 176. See After Amsterdam, Other Dutch Cities Consider Rules to Deal with Airbnb 
Housing, DUTCHNEW.NL (May 3, 2016), http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/ 
2016/05/after-amsterdam-other-dutch-cities-consider-rules-to-deal-with-airbnb 
[https://perma.cc/YN5K-X56R] (discussing the agreements between Dutch cities and 
Airbnb regarding occupancy and number of properties). 
 177. See New York Bill Would Ban Airbnb Listings for Some Short-Term Rentals, NBC
NEWS (June 21, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/new-york-bill-would-ban-
airbnb-listings-some-short-term-n596111 [https://perma.cc/G5DV-Q92S]; Mike Vilensky, 
Albany Approves Airbnb Penalties, WALL STREET J. (June 17, 2016), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/albany-approves-airbnb-penalties-1466206171 
[https://perma.cc/F456-HE3K] (discussing New York legislation that would ban Airbnb 
users from listing some short-term rentals). 
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that creates the biggest risks for changing the quality of neighborhoods, 
putting pressure on infrastructure, and overwhelming public services.  
Cities might consider exempting small-scale enterprises,178 such as an 
independent “eco-village” where community members participate in a 
sharing lifestyle that includes community gardens and shared access to 
renewable energy.179  Co-housing communities could also be exempted 
from other zoning requirements aimed at single-family residences, 
including setbacks, density, number of parking spaces, and restrictions on 
the number of dwelling units on a parcel of land.180  This same approach 
can be used when zoning for land uses.  For example, San Francisco 
created a land use category called “neighborhood agriculture” for gardens 
that are less than one acre in size, which allows the operator to grow, share, 
and sell the products of that garden.181
A number of risks in this category also center on the P2P business 
model.  Because a failure to pay lodging taxes has been shown to be a 
significant problem in some cities,182 platforms operating on a P2P basis 
should be required to provide basic information about tax collection to 
hosts, as Airbnb does.183  Airbnb also encourages hosts to have smoke 
alarms and carbon monoxide detectors in the home and notes that local 
regulations may require hosts to have smoke alarms in every room.184
 178. A number of regulatory schemes exempts small businesses, including securities 
laws and some parts of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See Deniz Anginer et al., Should Size 
Matter When Regulating Firms? Implications from Backdating of Executive Options, 15 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 5–8 (2012) (describing variety of exemptions for small 
businesses).
 179. EcoVillage at Ithaca is a co-housing community with shared access to gardens and 
community spaces. See Live, ECOVILLAGE ITHACA, http://ecovillageithaca.org/live 
[https://perma.cc/SGX2-3HY9] (last visited July 22, 2016).  Residents of the EcoVillage 
occasionally share or rent rooms to the public. Room(s) For Rent in Song, ECOVILLAGE
ITHACA, http://ecovillageithaca.org/live/rentals-sales/for-rent-in-song 
[https://perma.cc/U5EX-TUG7] (last visited July 22, 2016). 
 180. Julie Pennington, Zoning for Sharing, COMMUNITYENTERPRISELAW.COM,
http://communityenterpriselaw.org/zoning-and-housing/#Zoning_for_Sharing 
[https://perma.cc/DDA5-RKDX] (last visited July 22, 2016). 
 181. SAN FRANCISCO URBAN AGRICULTURE ALLIANCE, OVERVIEW OF SAN FRANCISCO’S
URBAN AGRICULTURE ZONING ORDINANCE (2011), available at
http://www.sfuaa.org/uploads/4/8/9/3/4893022/overview_of_sf_urban_ag_zoning_changes_
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQ7D-4J4P] (citing San Francisco Ordinance 66-11, File No. 
101537, approved by the Board of Supervisors on April 20, 2011, and effective May 20, 
2011; San Francisco Planning Code Section 102.35). 
 182. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 183. How Do Taxes Work, supra note 174. 
 184. I’m a Host. Am I Required to Have a Smoke and CO Detector Installed?, AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/515/i-m-a-host—am-i-required-to-have-a-smoke-and-
co-detector-installed?topic=359 [https://perma.cc/Z2AA-3JLU] (last visited July 22, 2016). 
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These educational efforts should be encouraged by regulators or required if 
they are not enacted voluntarily.  Large-scale enterprises should also be 
required to hold a minimum amount of liability insurance that would be 
extended to providers on the website, such as Airbnb currently offers to its 
hosts.185  Finally, because guests may not understand that non-commercial 
shared spaces are not required to meet the same regulations as commercial 
entities, the platform should be required to provide disclosures to guests 
that would make these regulatory differences and their potential 
consequences clear. 
4. Mission-Driven Enterprises: Focus on Verifying Benefits 
A final regulatory concern, the potential deception of consumers into 
believing that a company provides a social or environmental benefit when 
it does not, cuts across all three of our operational categories.  One 
potential solution to this problem is the creation of a designation for 
Sharing Companies.  Such a designation would create a meta-reputation for 
the entity itself, with external validation from an outside or third-party. 
Precedent for such a designation exists in the form of so-called 
“benefit corporations.”  In 2010, Maryland passed the first statute creating 
an entity called a benefit corporation,186 and today, thirty-two states have 
similar legislation that recognizes a specialized form of business entity 
designed to both earn a profit and serve a public purpose.187  Even in states 
that do not recognize such an entity, the non-profit entity B Labs offers a 
voluntary certification process for entities that want to call themselves a “B 
 185. See Huet, New Laws Push Uber, supra note 120 (describing gap in primary 
coverage provided by Uber); Host Protection Insurance, AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/host-protection-insurance [https://perma.cc/K943-EEJ2] (last 
visited July 22, 2016) (describing primary coverage of up to $1 million provided to hosts). 
 186. Anne Field, First-Ever Study of Maryland Benefit Corps Released, FORBES (Jan. 25, 
2013) (discussing study of Maryland benefit corporations); see MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. &
ASS’NS. §§ 5-6C (West 2012) (defining a benefit corporation and explaining its purpose and 
structure).
 187. See Status Tool, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW TRACKER,
http://www.socentlawtracker.org/#/bcorps [https://perma.cc/94Y3-6N3E] (last visited July 
22, 2016) (providing a “status tool” with links to states enacting laws permitting social 
enterprise business forms, including Benefit Corps.); see also Brett H. McDonnell, 
Committing to Doing Good and Doing Well: Fiduciary Duty in Benefit Corporations, 20
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19 (2014) (examining the fiduciary duty provisions of benefit 
corporation statutes); Kyle Westaway & Dirk Sampselle, The Benefit Corporation: An 
Economic Analysis with Recommendations to Courts, Boards, and Legislatures, 62 EMORY
L.J. 999 (2013) (looking at the usefulness of social enterprise statutes and areas of 
improvement for those statutes); J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social 
Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012) 
(discussing benefit corporation governance). 
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Corp.”188  Other entities have used a variety of practices to signal social or 
environmental commitments to customers, including certification standards 
like Fair Trade189 and third-party audit and reporting standards like the 
International Organization for Standardization’s (ISO) 14000 code 
covering “environmental management” and Social Accountability 
International’s (SA) 8000 code.190
Just as B Labs currently certifies B Corps and a Fair Trade 
certification signifies adherence to voluntary labor and trade practices, we 
propose a certification process for entities that claim to provide the benefits 
of the sharing economy.  This certification process would assess the entity 
across several categories, including: market power, labor practices, 
governance, environmental impact, and collaborative impact.  The 
certification would also consider the manner in which the entity increases 
the efficient use of underutilized assets and resources, facilitates open 
access to shared data, creates privacy controls, allows for access to 
knowledge and education, and develops shared products, services, or open 
source technology.  An entity that scores above a certain level on the 
assessment would then be certified as a “Sharing Company.” 
The companies included in the new sharing economy, however, are 
not inevitably beneficial to the environment or to communities and 
individuals.191  A number of studies have recently turned attention to the 
question of whether collective consumption platforms actually result in 
environmental benefits and concluded that enterprises that do not 
deliberately assess their practices are unlikely to provide significant 
benefits and may in fact increase consumption.192  Creating a certification 
 188. Become a B Corp, B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp 
[https://perma.cc/WSV3-K83W] (last visited July 22, 2016). 
 189. See, e.g., Certification & Your Business, FAIR TRADE USA, 
http://fairtradeusa.org/certification [https://perma.cc/ACD7-ULAG] (last visited July 22, 
2016) (outlining the Fair Trade certification model and certification standards). 
 190. Businesses can seek certification under common standards such as the SA-8000 or 
the ISO 14000. ISO 14000–Environmental management, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION,
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso14000 [https://perma.cc/MZD4-KGTE] (last visited July 22, 
2016); SA8000® Standard, SOC. ACCOUNTABILITY INT’L, http://www.sa-
intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPage&pageId=1689 [https://perma.cc/PM3T-
L2VJ] (last visited July 22, 2016); see also MARC J. EPSTEIN, MAKING SUSTAINABILITY
WORK: BEST PRACTICES IN MANAGING AND MEASURING CORPORATE SOCIAL,
ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS 72–78 (2008) (detailing Toyota’s implementation 
of corporate standards that take into account sustainability strategies); Adelle Blackett, 
Global Governance, Legal Pluralism and the Decentered State: A Labor Law Critique of 
Codes of Corporate Conduct, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 401, 413–17 & nn.38–39 
(2001) (describing coordinated efforts by multinational enterprises to monitor and enforce 
minimum labor standards, including SA-8000). 
 191. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
 192. See supra notes 148-149 and accompanying text. 
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system would force sharing economy enterprises to assess their practices 
and determine if they are indeed creating the benefits they proclaim. 
A self-regulatory sharing certification system would increase the 
legitimacy of the sharing economy and reduce concerns about 
sharewashing.  It could also assist regulators engaging in the risk 
assessment process that lies at the heart of the regulatory structure 
contemplated herein.  If the entity is able to achieve a sharing certification, 
municipalities may be encouraged to exempt it from certain regulations.  
For instance, an on-demand service enterprise certified as a Sharing 
Company may be exempted from certain recordkeeping requirements, a 
maker platform certified as a Sharing Company may have access to certain 
tax benefits, and a shared housing Sharing Company may be exempt from 
specified zoning regulations. 
As a potential complement to assessment and certification programs, 
we note that publicity and reputation may also drive companies to engage 
in self-regulation.  TaskRabbit provides an example. After being widely 
criticized for facilitating a system that resulted in workers getting paid less 
than minimum wage, TaskRabbit changed its business model.  First, it did 
away with the “bidding” system, in which Taskers bid for jobs, which often 
resulted in a race to the lowest possible wage.193  The site then set a 
minimum floor for wages at a level that is higher than the federal minimum 
wage.194
CONCLUSION
The sharing economy, as popularly understood, plays an increasingly 
central role in the economy as a whole.  While it has evolved in several 
ways from its original form, its impact on both workers and consumers 
raises the question of how best to regulate this new form of business.  
Regulating the new sharing economy presents a growing challenge, as new 
entities create gray zones in areas that were once legally black and white. 
In the push and pull between protecting the public and fostering 
innovation and social change, perhaps the clumsiest response would be to 
create one-size-fits-all regulations built around a concept of sharing that no 
longer applies.  Instead, regulators should create more illustrative 
categories for regulation that are built around identification and mitigation 
 193. Harrison Weber, TaskRabbit Users Revolt as the Company Shuts Down Its Bidding 
System, VENTURE BEAT (July 10, 2014), http://venturebeat.com/2014/07/10/taskrabbit-users-
revolt-as-the-company-shuts-down-its-bidding-system/ [https://perma.cc/S5D4-N2SG]. 
 194. Jeremy Quittner, How Peer to Peer Worker Services Are Changing the Debate on 
Wages, INC. (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.inc.com/jeremy-quittner/freelance-sites-add-
worker-protections-like-higher-minimum-wage.html [https://perma.cc/4R4Z-EZLW]. 
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of risks posed by different types of entities.  We propose a taxonomy of the 
new sharing economy that includes entities that focus on reducing 
consumption, entities that facilitate on-demand services, and those 
concerned with sharing housing and space.  We believe that delineating the 
differences among these sectors is an important first step toward improving 
the quality of regulation for the sharing economy as a whole. 
This article begins a conversation about an appropriate regulatory 
taxonomy to move toward a system for thoughtful regulation of the new 
sharing economy.  By understanding the different types of players in this 
new sharing economy and the specific concerns each type presents, 
regulators can create more narrowly-tailored and efficient regulation 
without quashing beneficial economic growth. 
